tract are precise, or in that of compensation for the money laid out. On the other hand, *Pilling* v. *Armitage*, 12 Ves. 85, decides that if a tenant lays out money in building, &c., in the hope of an extended term or otherwise, but without the knowledge of the landlord, he has no claim to relief either in law or equity. The question was whether the present case came within the one rule or the other, a point which of course depended upon the evidence. Vice-Chancellor Stuart, in whose court the suit was originally brought, took the tenants' view of the matter, considering that substantial justice was on their side; and decreed accordingly. From this decision the case was taken direct to the House of Lords, when Lord Kingsdown agreed with the court below; but, the majority of the learned Lords present being of a contrary opinion, it was declared that the bill ought to have been dismissed. We shall join the following passage from the judgment of Lord Chancellor Cranworth as embodying substantially the view taken by the House of Lords:—"If a stranger build knowingly upon my land, there is no principle of equity which prevents me from insisting on having back my land, with all the additional value which the occupier has imprudently added to it. If a tenant of mine does the same thing, he cannot insist on refusing to give up the estate at the end of his term. It was his own folly to build. I have already stated that there was no agreement with the landlord, for any further estate or interest, but if it could have been shown on the part of the respondent that the landlord, believing the tenant to be ignorant of his rights, had purposely advised him to go on, the case might fall within the same principle as a case of fraud. But no such case has been made out to my satisfaction."

Thus ended this celebrated case, much to the advantage of Sir John Ramsden, and equally to the detriment of the townspeople of Huddersfield, a memorable instance of the danger of attempting to dispense with the proper legal forms of conveyancing.—*Solicitors' Journal.*

RECENT LEGAL APPOINTMENTS.

The legal consequences which flow from a change of ministry are always of interest to the profession, and those which the recent change has produced, both in England and Ireland, have been of more than usual importance. The highest office on the bench and the highest offices at the bar, are of course necessarily involved in such a proceeding; but both at Westminster and Dublin further effects have resulted from the going out of one ministry and the coming in of another, which we have recently witnessed. In Scotland the necessary changes are confined to the law-officers of the Crown, and do not affect the bench; and in the instance now referred to, no such collateral results as have been experienced in Westminster Hall and the Four Courts, have disturbed the serenity of the Parliament House.

The English appointments, we may take upon us to say, have been most satisfactory to the profession. Nothing could be more proper than that the great seal should be again entrusted to Lord Chelmsford. When in 1858, he was made Lord Chancellor, doubts were entertained as to the manner in which one, whose fame had been achieved at the Common Law Bar, would acquit himself as an equity judge; but the result proved that these doubts had been uncalled for. Since he left office in 1859, his judgments in the House of Lords have still further advanced his reputation as a lawyer. No man was ever more lucid in the statement of his arguments and views than Lord Chelmsford. We have had many more learned and profound lawyers, but few who could set forth their opinions on any legal question in a more clear and intelligible manner. His ability as a *nisi prius* advocate was universally acknowledged, and he was equally distinguished when at the bar by the manner in which he conducted an argument in banc. The qualities which he has shown as an appellate judge, were only such, as those who knew him had anticipated; and whether he may be destined to occupy the woolsack for a longer or shorter period, it may be confidentially expected that his judicial reputation will be proportionately enhanced.

The appointment of Sir Hugh Cairns as Attorney-General, was, under the circumstances, almost a matter of course. No one has ever doubted his great ability as a lawyer, and his efficiency in the House of Commons made him invaluable to any ministry. No less deserving was Mr. Bovill of the position which he has attained as Solicitor-General. His successful career at the bar, and his popularity with the members of his circuit and the bar generally, rendered his appointment highly satisfactory to the profession. No man ever more fairly and honourably earned the important position of Solicitor-General than Mr Bovill; and whatever fortune may have in store for him, we are persuaded that he will be found qualified for any office to which he may be called.

With respect to the circumstances which led to the vacancy on the bench, which has been filled up by the appointment of Sir Fitzroy Kelly as Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, we must be allowed to express a sincere wish that anything similar may never again occur. When a judge feels himself incapacitated for the proper discharge of his duties, he ought to retire at once, and not wait for a change of ministry, or any party or political contingency. The proceeding to which we refer was scarcely fair to the bar, and it was certainly not satisfactory to the public. But as regards the appointment of Sir Fitzroy Kelly, we may venture to say, that it has been unanimously approved of by the profession. His great ability, the high posi-