

exists and is used, the international policeman would, to say the least, have some difficulty in getting a decision to use his truncheon, even if he has it, except possibly against urchins stealing apples. The experience, so far, in Palestine, shows that he may be timid in using it even in cases where only little fellows are involved.

The basic difficulty and danger is, then distrust and suspicion between the Great Powers. Should we not, however, in the face of that distrust, indeed possibly because of it, look to our international organization and see how we can strengthen it?

There is no doubt that organic strengthening is impossible as long as the veto exists and can be used, as it has been used, without effective limitation. It does stand in the way of genuine collective security organized and made effective through the United Nations as it exists today. I know that a formal attempt to abolish that veto at this time, would mean the quick break-up of the organization. Nevertheless, just as something has been done, much more can be done to limit the effect of the veto, and thereby make the United Nations stronger without driving any state out of the United Nations unless it is looking for any excuse to get out.

There is the limitation that can be imposed by custom and convention. That has already determined, for instance, that mere abstention from voting does not necessarily bring the veto into effect. Furthermore, permanent members of the Council who are willing to do so can impose on themselves self-denying ordinances - as indeed some have done - not to use their veto in whole categories of questions which come before the Council. This may have some effect on the others.

What do we do, however, if disunity and suspicion between the Great Powers causes the veto power to be used irresponsibly and selfishly and if any limitation of that power, by custom or by an amendment of the Charter, is impossible? What do we do then to build up an international agency capable of keeping the peace, because it will have sufficient power, under international control, without the veto, to enforce its decisions.

Three courses are open. One, to carry on as we have been, in the hope that the international situation may in time improve to the point where the defects and weaknesses of the Charter which now seem so glaring, will become academic, and where the unanimity of the Great Powers will be expressed positively, by action for peace, and not merely negatively, by inaction against war. Until that day comes, the greatest service the United Nations can perform is by keeping alive; by providing a meeting place and a platform where all nations are given at least the chance of talking out their differences, instead of fighting them out. Meanwhile, changes can be made in the structure of the organization as its foundation becomes more solidly based on better international relations.

That is one course. A second, at the other extreme, is to insist on a suitable amendment of the Charter, and if that is blocked by a veto (amendment is subject to the veto) then to scrap the present organization and form a new one, with a Charter which will permit it to work. If any state wishes to stay out, that would be its privilege and its responsibility.

This is a drastic course which should, of course, be adopted only as a last desperate resort.

There is a third way which is much to be preferred to this extremity though it is not nearly so satisfactory as an agreed limitation of the veto by convention or by amendment of the Charter would be. This course would retain the present Charter, but would frankly recognize that