PAPER NO. 8: NORWAY

SUBMISSION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BERLIN MANDATE, INCLUDING THE NORWEGIAN VIEW ON ISSUES THAT WOULD BENEFIT FROM ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

With reference to the Berlin Mandate, section III, paragraph 4, The Government of Norway is of the opinion that a thorough analysis and assessment phase is clearly needed. In this respect, we would like to focus on particularly two important aspects that would benefit from further analysis and assessment: (i) The need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of the Parties and (ii) The need for cost-effective, coordinated economic instruments. In addition we address the need for more information regarding voluntary agreements.

(i) The need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of the Parties

Norway has earlier referred to the need for an "equitable burdensharing" in developing further the commitments under the Convention. Similarly, other delegations have addressed the need for "a fair distribution of the costs for all Parties involved" in order to establish a level playing field. This point of departure, moreover, represents an important part of the foundation on which the main objectives of the AGBM process is based. According to paragraph 2 (a) of the Berlin Mandate, the process shall take into account "the differences in starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource base,, as well as the need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort...."

Henceforth, a paramount challenge ahead of us will be to operationalize this clause of the Berlin Mandate.

The Government of Norway has advocated a common emission target for a group of Parties, such as the OECD, which is to be achieved through "equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties". In practical terms this would mean that the emission targets for each of the Parties would be differentiated on the basis of their "differences in starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases".

An analogy to such an approach is found in the Sulphur Protocol adopted in 1994 under the UNECE Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, where the commitments for the respective Parties are differentiated on the basis of, i.a., the <u>natural environment's critical loads</u>. With respect to climate change, where the effects of emissions largely are unrelated to where they occur, the idea of a fair distribution of costs suggests that the <u>"critical economic loads"</u> would be an appropriate point of departure. In other words, commitments under a Protocol or other legal instrument should be differentiated among the Parties in emission terms. In terms of total economic loads, however, there should be no differentiation among the Parties which are part of the common emission target.