

'stockpile stewardship' and weapons production was reclassified as 'stockpile management'."⁹⁶

Perhaps more importantly, several studies done in the United States have suggested the need to retain a nuclear weapons capability, including a first-use option, against adversaries with the potential for WMD or even conventional forces that could inflict damage on American forces and interests. In 1992 The Strategic Deterrence Study Group, argued that the United States could not "count on [conventional deterrence] to deal with many lethal Third World threats...and also supported the 'first-use' of nuclear weapons if American military forces are confronted with superior conventional forces 'at remote places around the world'."⁹⁷

In November 1997, President Clinton issued a new U.S. Nuclear Weapons Employment Guidance as contained in Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD-60). It declares that the United States would no longer be required to fight and win a protracted nuclear war. Bates and McHorney point out that PDD-60 is "relevant to counter proliferation because it supports the possible employment of nuclear weapons against a country that uses chemical or biological weapons against American military personnel or civilians." The exact contents of the document remain secret but,

"If available information about PDD-60 is accurate, the new policy would definitely lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Some analysts fear that PDD-60 may encourage other nations to acquire nuclear weapons as a means of deterring chemical and biological attacks. The use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state would invalidate security assurances given by the United States to signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."⁹⁸

The Clinton administration has tried to allay fears about PDD-60 and its impact on non-proliferation policy. In 1998 it openly assured allies and Russia that it has "no plans or intention of using nuclear weapons against Iraq." However, it also stated that it "did not rule out in advance any capability available to use." "Thus," conclude Bates and McHorney, "the Clinton Administration failed to rule out the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state."⁹⁹ And this option remains part of the counter-proliferation approach.

Even authors who stress the disutility of nuclear weapons in view of the Bosnia-type conflicts and the threat of non-state actors that are likely to be the norm, suggest a use for nuclear weapons. Manning, for example, points out that nuclear weapons might still be needed in a "counter-proliferation mission" such as "a preemptive attack upon a buried weapons of mass destruction

⁹⁶ Manning, "The Nuclear Age," p.78.

⁹⁷ Bates and McHorney, *Developing a Theoretical Model*, p. 40.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 47.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 48.