

INTRODUCTION

There is at present no specific verification regime integral to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). However, Article V specifies the States Parties "...undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention." Article VI (1) also specifies a complaint procedure with regard to a "...breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention...", which would see a State Party lodging its complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. "Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity...."

It is worth recalling two of the Sixteen Verification Principles agreed by consensus in a Working Group of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and subsequently endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution A/RES/43/81(B) dated 1 December 1988. These two particular principles say:

- "Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements."
- "Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical means, international technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections."

It is reasonable, then, to contemplate verification of the BTWC in terms of mutually supporting and well defined measures contributing to the consideration of "all possible evidence" that may support a judgement of compliance or non-compliance with obligations under the Convention. The UNDC report on "Verification in All its Aspects", and the corresponding UNGA Resolution, recognized that the effectiveness of verification can be enhanced through the synergistic effects of interacting verification measures.