

If you are really worried about stopping war in Europe and if, as I believe, neither side really wants to use war as an instrument of policy in Europe, there is a lot to be said — and I said this before Mr. Gorbachev — for thinking about, in the medium term, some sort of co-operation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on how you control the situation in Europe.

The real problem, I think, is a political one and that is that 40 years dependence in Europe on American nuclear protection has corrupted European thinking about defence. The European countries no longer really think about it seriously at all because they have no direct responsibility.

If I can quote two little apophthegms, if that is the right word to use: first of all, the Healey theorem which I developed when I was Defence Secretary 20 years ago, which is that it only takes 5 per cent credibility of American nuclear retaliation to deter the Russians, but it takes 95 per cent credibility to reassure the allies. Almost the whole of the strategic argument inside NATO has been about reassuring the allies rather than deterring the Russians. That is the Healey theorem.

The American answer to that, which an American friend of mine once put to me, is the American feeling about their allies that, if you scare them, they go crazy and, if you don't scare them, they go fishing.

I think that America's allies — and this includes, if I may say so, Canada as much as the European countries — now have a responsibility to think much harder about defence policy and to adjust their own defence programmes so as to produce an effective conventional deterrent against possible attack and a conventional response to a war which may break out for reasons to which deterrence is totally irrelevant.

Our other great obligation, I think, is to try to think this problem through so as to exercise some real influence over American policy, and, at the risk of losing any friends I still have in this room, I would try to make this point. My experience, watching and being engaged very often in negotiations with the United States, not only on defence issues but on economic issues, is that, if America's allies ever reach agreement on a clear, collective view, they can nearly always swing the battle in Washington. First of all, the United States' political system is by far the most porous and open to external influence in the whole of the Western World, and, secondly, Amer-