

forgotten that this evening I am addressing an Academy—and ever since the philosopher and his disciples walked in

the olive grove of Academe  
Plato's retirement, where the Attic bird  
Trills her thick-warbled notes the summer long,

the word Academy or its correlative in other tongues has carried with it the connotation of stateliness and dignity, and not alone true science—although indeed Horace bids "*Inter silvas Academi quaerere verum.*" I must be more formal in speaking to this select few than on the former occasion when addressing the many-headed multitude—noblesse oblige.

But I am sure you will not complain if you find a repetition at this time of something already said, either at the meeting of the Ontario Medical Association or at other times—I am making no pretence of originality.

You will, also, not be offended if I speak didactically and not argumentatively. "If I am to listen to the opinion of another," says Goethe, "it must be definitely expressed. Of the problematical, I have enough in myself."

The witness appears in a court—what is a court?

Man is a social animal; and so soon as in the course of evolution he became such, it was imperative that his conduct should be governed by rule of some kind—in short, by law. Obedience to law must needs be considered right: disobedience, wrong, a sin—for wrong and sin were at first all one, "when wild in woods the noble savage ran," as the poet says with unconscious irony.

If a man conceived his rights to have been trenched upon, only two courses might be open. If the force of public opinion (and no civilized man can wholly appreciate the tremendous power of public opinion in a primitive community) should not prove effective to restore him to his rights or to bring about adequate compensation, he might be obliged to avenge his wrongs if he could by his own strong right hand. That is the case when

"the good old rule  
Sufficeth them, the simple plan,  
That they should take who have the power,  
And they should keep who can."