

got most of his education in Glasgow, where he turned it to practical account by going into business as an ironmonger—somewhat like his old chieftain, Joe Chamberlain, whose politics he adopted lock, stock and barrel, to the last degree of protection. No one doubts that Bonar Law is a good business man, or that he has been a successful member of parliament. Before the war he was talking louder than he should about the Home Rule question. Since the war he has proved that he knows how to hit straight from the shoulder, and that he is willing to bury a hatchet for the sake of national unity.

Secretary for India

SAME monocle and orchid—or they looked the same—as his father; same long, interesting face as the great Joseph Chamberlain, the new Secretary for India, Hon. Austen Chamberlain, is no tyro in public business. Sons of great fathers are not usually great. The new Secretary is regarded as a fine administrator. In 1902 he was Postmaster-General, and proved that he knew how to work with and manage other men by getting their opinions on how to run his department. At that time his father was Colonial Secretary. Austen was never a brilliant speaker like his father, though his first speech in the House moved Gladstone to words of praise. He afterwards became Chancellor of the Exchequer, and since his party went out of power he has been an able critic of the Government. At one time it looked as though he might be made leader of the party, but he moved to promote Bonar Law.

The Ex-First Lord

TRYING to fancy Winston Churchill as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster is something like imagining Teddy Roosevelt as a head waiter. Hon. Winston was never intended to be a quiet, amiable gentleman. He was designed for action, with

or without sufficient thought, but always as is said in a certain vernacular, "Something doing." The Churchills were always so, ever since the days of the old Duke of Marlborough. War is in their breed. Winston Churchill practically began life as a soldier, serving in various campaigns in as many parts of the Empire, and once out of it. When mere soldiering was too slow for him he took on the duties of war correspondent, in which role he played a lively part in the Boer War, where he saw action in nearly a dozen danger zones and took part in several adventures befitting the temperament of a soldier-news-paperman. When the Boer War was over he went on the platform lecturing about it, and most of those who heard his lectures predicted that Mr. Churchill would never be a good lecturer and might never become even a good speaker of any sort.

Nobody at that time imagined that when the world's greatest war broke out, this same adventurous, irrepresible, almost irresponsible Churchill would be the First Lord of the Admiralty, all but autocrat of the greatest navy that ever mobilized under any flag; that the said navy would be very largely the joint creation of Churchill's "bête noir," Lord Fisher, and himself; that for years Churchill would have been the man who on the naval end was constantly dinning into England's ears the sound of the German menace; that when the greatest navy put to sea and Churchill's passionate zeal for "something doing" was vindicated, in less than ten months he would have quarrelled with Lord Fisher, been more or less responsible for one bad naval defeat, one or two naval fiascos, and the author of the daring scheme to break through the Dardanelles without a land force. Still less did even his worst wishers imagine that in the tenth month of war, after the British Navy had done more than its share of England's work in the war up to that time, the First Lord would find it necessary to resign, and Lord Fisher along with him.

But Churchill was always dealing with the unexpected. When the great shuffle came and men stepped out of the party cabinet to make room for

men of other parties, Churchill quietly dropped his stormy responsibilities at the Admiralty and took over the Duchy of Lancaster, a sort of exalted game-keeper's and bursar's job, which will leave him plenty of leisure for reflection.

Leisure? Reflection? Oh no—neither of these. Churchill was born for doing something. One of these days he will come back to a big task, somewhat chastened by experience, but still the essential Winston, burning with enthusiasm—for something.

The New First Sea Lord

ADMIRAL SIR HENRY JACKSON steps into the sailor boots of Lord Fisher. A few weeks ago Sir Henry was obscured in the British Navy, from which every now and then some brilliant man emerges to take the place of such men as Beresford and Fisher. He is a fellow of the Royal Naval Society and understands the complete science of the modern navy created largely by Lord Fisher. He has been in the Navy since he was midshipmite at the age of 13—just forty-seven years ago. One side of his development has been as a practical scientist; the other that of a sailor. He has risen through all the grades in the Navy; was made a captain in 1896, and has since been promoted on his merits to various posts, naval attaché, navy controllership, commander of the sixth cruiser squadron in the Mediterranean, head of the Royal Naval War College, chief of the war staff in the Admiralty and commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet. As First Sea Lord he is a Minister not in the Cabinet, and is expected to work harmoniously with Mr. Balfour. This combination of a literary statesman with a quiet, scientific Sea Lord, is considerable contrast to the fiery bulldog team, Churchill and Fisher, who have just stepped out. It is to be hoped that these two remarkably fine men will spring as many surprises at the Admiralty as the other combination did. If they do, the navy will be heard from before very long.

The Blame for the "Lusitania" Tragedy

By THEODORE S. WOOLSEY, LL.D., Recently Professor of International Law at Yale

THERE is, I think, a clear distinction between the "Lusitania" case and the cases of the two American ships attacked by the Germans, if the reports are accurate, the "Cushing" by aeroplanes, the "Gulflight" by submarines. The "Lusitania" was a British merchantman, unarmed, carrying much war material—although this could be positively known to the Germans only by search—carrying also mails and passengers. If captured she was a good prize; if unable to send her under a prize crew to a German port, which was clearly the case, her destruction was legitimate. This destruction should have been inflicted after a due sequence of processes: first, a warning to stop, which, if disregarded, authorized a torpedo shot; second, scrutiny of her nationality to make sure that she was enemy's property; third, opportunity given passengers and crew, being non-combatants, to leave the ship. To do otherwise is in violation of immemorial usage, in violation of humanity.

To sink an enemy's merchant ship without warning is not piracy, as an eminent publicist declares, because piracy involves the idea of robbery on the high seas with an *animus furandi* aimed at all ships, not at those of a particular nation or nations. It is simply murder. If passengers and crew are subjects of an enemy it is none the less murder, but as war already exists, no penalty is possible except reprisals or the punishment of the murderers after a fair trial, if the fortune of war at any time makes this feasible.

If, on the other hand, neutral subjects are involved, their government must pay the penalty for the act, whether pecuniary or personal, into its own hands. But notice that in the case of the "Lusitania" there is no question of blockade or of contraband. These are primarily restraints put upon neutral ships and cargoes. This was an enemy ship subject to destruction under the conditions named. If, owing to the peculiar nature of the submarine, these conditions could not be complied with, such destruction is illegal—a crime against humanity—and must not be attempted. There is, then, no essential difference between the status of the British and the neutral persons on board the "Lusitania," except as re-



"OUT DAMNED SPOT!" BUT IT WILL NOT OUT.

The Modern Lady Macbeth, according to the New York Herald.

gards the manner of exacting reparation for the crime.

But the German attacks without a warning upon the "Cushing" by aeroplanes and the "Gulflight" by submarines, both American ships sailing under their own flag, involve neutral rights as well as the rights of human-

ity. If they were carrying contraband, which only a proper search could develop, with a hostile destination, the contraband goods are subject to capture, but not the vessel, unless its contraband lading forms more than half its cargo. This also implies search. If they were violating

blockade, to legalize capture the blockade must be effective, that is, continuous and sufficiently efficient to really prevent access to the enemy's coast line. Notoriously, this is not the case.

The occasional appearance of a submarine, even the occasional torpedoing of a vessel, is not enough to constitute a legal blockade. Our government has taken this ground. Failure to search for contraband, then, and failure to maintain an effective blockade, are fatal flaws in German submarine activity in both these directions. They are violations of our neutral rights. To attack without warning and examination, whether from below or above the sea, is also a violation of humanity. Whatever the facts of loading and destination may be, therefore, in the cases of the "Cushing" and the "Gulflight," the Germans have put themselves in the wrong and must be dealt with.

And how if they refuse apology and compensation? There are two ways: through indemnity and through punishment. If loss of property and loss of life are to be merely indemnified, the simple way is to seize for the purpose whatever German property we can find, public or private, the latter because its owners may look to their government for reimbursement. The German ships in our ports come under this head. The other, the violent way, is, of course, war. But indemnification, however desirable, is not the only, not the most important, remedy which we should seek. We must have assurance against the repetition of these wrongs. This may be forthcoming if demanded. If not, is it not a fair suggestion that we seek union with the other neutral powers which have likewise suffered even more heavily than ourselves? These are Holland and Norway, Denmark and Sweden, with memories of two armed neutralities. Perhaps a third is indicated to which the United States would be welcome as it was not in 1780. A united demand for the surrender of this criminal policy of sinking neutral ships and their hapless crews on suspicion of one knows not what, might be listened to. If not, then, as the diplomatists say, we should take whatever steps our interests demand. For truly the cup of wrath is running over.—Leslie's Weekly.