

of the general rule, is not restricted to such cases. The element of inexpediency is clearly involved whether it be a question of constraining a person to retain a manager of his business or a groom.

5. Qualification of the general rule where the applicant for relief is in the employment of a body of trustees.—In the exercise of its general jurisdiction over the administration of trusts, a court of equity has in some instances enjoined the trustees of charity schools from dismissing the master, this remedy being granted on the ground that the trustees had abused or exceeded the powers conferred upon them by the express terms of the regulating instrument¹. But it would seem to be a general rule, that in cases

who is objectionable to him, or in whom he does not happen to confide, would, if legal, be surely hard; and, sitting in a court of equity, I do not feel any inclination to do it." "I consider it more fit for a court of equity to leave the plaintiff to obtain redress by damages or otherwise in a court of law than to exercise its peculiar jurisdiction by compelling the bishop specifically to submit to the practical exercise of such rights, if rights they are."

This case was cited in a later one where the court refused an injunction to restrain the managing committee of a hospital from interfering with the plaintiff in the performance of his duties as medical officer by suspending him. *Millican v. Sullivan* (1888) C.A., 4 Times L.R. 203.

¹In *Dummer v. Chippenham* (1807) 14 Ves. 245, the power of the court to restrain a municipal corporation from abusing its power of dismissing the master of a charity school administered by it, as trustee, was asserted.

In *Willis v. Child* (1851) 13 Beav. 117, 20 L.J. Ch. 113, by a scheme of the Court of Chancery for the regulation of a grammar school, authority had been given to the trustees "upon such grounds as they should, at their discretion, in the due exercise and execution of the powers and trusts reposed in them, deem just," to remove the master at once and confirm it at a subsequent special meeting. The trustees having grounds of complaint against the master, referred the matter, without his knowledge, to a committee, who investigated the case in his absence and without his knowledge, and reported against him. The trustees, without communicating the report or hearing him, confirmed it in his absence, and resolved to remove him; and they summoned a second meeting to confirm the resolution. The master then attended and was heard, and the removal was confirmed without any other hearing or inquiry in his presence. The court held, first, that the regulation did not confer upon the trustees an arbitrary power to dismiss the master, upon any grounds which they might deem just, free from any control of the court; and, secondly, that the master had had no proper opportunity afforded him of defending himself—no sufficient means of explanation and no means of proving his defence. The trustees were accordingly restrained by Lord Langdale, M.R., from enforcing the dismissal and ejecting the master. The conclusion of the learned judge with regard to the extent of the powers of the trustees was based upon the considerations,