

results of a different system. Had timely concessions been made, had self-government been frankly conceded, had the British soldier been presented to the Colonial mind as the representative of order, and the friend of freedom, who can doubt that the first American War would never have occurred,—that the second, which grew out of the bitter feeling engendered by the first, might have been avoided. Even had a period arrived when political separation became a convenience or a necessity, it might have been arranged by friendly negotiation; and an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon family, would probably have insured freedom of commerce and perpetual amity and good will. The British troops might have been withdrawn, marching to their places of embarkation to the sound of merry music, and followed by the acclamations of the self-reliant communities whose early struggles they had shared, whose industrial development they had protected, whose liberties they had never menaced, whose blood they had never shed. Though it may be too late to speculate on what might have resulted from applying to the old Thirteen Colonies the system which now obtains, no man can deny that the old one, which you would substitute for the modern, bore nothing but bitter fruit, and is condemned by every page of our old Colonial History.

Let us see, now, how the modern system works. Great Britain, to maintain her position as a first-rate European power, is compelled to keep up a respectable standing army. While Russia maintains a standing army of 486,000 men—and France, England's nearest neighbour, with a chief of unrivalled enterprise, sagacity, and soaring ambition at her head, can call into the field in a few days 680,000 men—could England, if she had not a Colony in the world, hold any but a very inferior European position with an army of less than 100,000 in peaceful times? Could she defend her soil from intrusion and insult, in case of war, with less? If she could not, then the Army Estimates would not be much reduced even if she threw off her colonies to-morrow. The legions might come home, and the outlying portions of this great Empire might be left to drift into new alliances and hostile connexions, but the legions would be wanted to defend the British Islands, without the moral support or material aid of millions of human beings, ruthlessly severed from all active interest in their success, by being told that their friendship was not worth preserving.

It is, then, folly to suppose that the Provinces, having no power to protect their interests by diplomacy, and no voice in determining the policy out of which hostilities may arise, would ever consent to keep up standing armies, to waste their revenues, and to assume the burden of their own defence in any wars that England might provoke. To enforce your policy would engender ill feeling, and ultimate separation. The boy who is asked to do a man's work, and is driven from the homestead because he lacks the strength, may still love the scenery which charmed his eye, and the old trees that shaded the threshold from which he has been driven, but to expect him to love very much the brethren who expelled him, would be to hope rather