

encouraging since each side continued to increase its missile force, while not adding to its bomber force.

The major new development of the 1970's has been the success of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). The imminence of a new and enormously costly arms race between the two super powers to acquire and deploy anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM's) which also threatened to destabilize the existing strategic balance, led President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev to reach the first historic SALT agreement. Each side undertook to construct only two ABM sites, and in fact each country has actually acquired only one. In the second SALT agreement, the two sides decided to limit themselves to 2,400 nuclear weapons delivery systems each.

The logic of this situation has produced the significant changes noted earlier in the missions of NORAD. With no defence against missiles, it is now accepted that only a minimal bomber defence makes sense (some have called it a "coast guard of the Air") to protect against a sneak attack—and, more importantly, to act as a deterrent against the acquisition of a new Soviet bomber capability. The USSR has developed a new supersonic bomber, with possibly an intercontinental capability identified in NATO parlance as the "Backfire". A continued low-level air defence capability may dissuade the Soviet Union from building up a new bomber force, although it must be recognized that other considerations could also influence a Soviet decision.

Your Committee accordingly believes that retention of a limited, anti-bomber defensive capability in North America continues to make some contribution to strategic stability. The Committee recognizes, also that Canada remains fairly important for the adequate performance of NORAD's warning and defence functions. Existing technology is such that radars must be located on Canadian territory if adequate early warning of a bomber attack is to be guaranteed. Furthermore, intruding aircraft must be physically intercepted in order to determine their identity and intentions. The capacity for making such interceptions, well forward of potential targets, is crucial for the maintenance of strategic stability and requires the use of Canadian airspace. By the same reasoning, Canadian airspace would be the first line of defence in the event of an actual bomber attack on North America.

While recognizing that these factors require cooperation between Canada and the United States, Members of the Committee questioned whether the integrated command structure, which NORAD provides, was still required to make that cooperation effective. General Carr said that an integrated command is not "absolutely essential" in peacetime. In practical terms, because of the siting of the SAGE complexes and the availability of aircraft, Canada now lacks the capability adequately to provide the necessary peacetime surveillance and control over the whole of its territory. But if the proposed Eastern and Western regions, which would together cover all Canadian territory, were established with the necessary radar and computer and communications support, then, as General Carr agreed, "we will have established a capability to look at our own, and control our own, air space". General Carr adamantly maintained, however, that an integrated command would

be indispensable in times of increased tension or in war, when active air defence would be necessary.

Professor Cox suggested that the only viable alternative to having an integrated command would be to have separate commands with contingency plans for close cooperation in an emergency. As noted in the previous section, your Committee recognized that various levels of cooperation might be agreed upon. Considering the extent to which Canada's interests are intertwined with those of the United States, however, the Committee believes that, as a minimum, cooperation would have to extend to coordination of emergency roles, joint exercises, joint intelligence activities, and the provision of overflight privileges.

#### The Case of France

Its deliberations along these lines led your Committee to consider the position of France, which appeared to be in a somewhat analogous situation vis-à-vis NATO's air defence forces in Central Europe, to Canada's position in North America. While the assigned forces of the NATO countries in Europe are under an integrated operational command, France's forces have been maintained under national command since 1966. However, France retains the option of placing its forces under the operational command of SACEUR at any time, and could quickly do so in the event of hostilities. The French air force maintains a degree of readiness for such a contingency by participating in joint NATO exercises. A further parallel to the approach that Canada might take exists in that France participates in and contributes financially and materially to NADGE (NATO Air Defence Ground Environment), which gathers and assesses radar information in NATO Europe and is at the core of NATO's air defence command arrangements.

The analogy breaks down, however, on other grounds. In the first place, France is geographically in the strategic hinterland of Western Europe, separated by Germany and the Benelux countries from the source of an attack. France thus derives a substantial measure of security from reliance upon the very large air defence forces maintained in Germany and the Benelux countries. Drawing on figures published in *The Military Balance 1974-75*, it is estimated that the NATO allies in Europe have roughly 575 interceptor aircraft, 350 of which are in Northern and Central Europe, and 1300 air defence missiles, (which are more effective in the confined air space of Western Europe than they are in North America). There is no such well-defended zone between Canada and the only possible source of an attack, the USSR. Equally important, the security of the other European allies is not absolutely dependent on the prior defence of French air space. This situation is exactly reversed in the case of North America, where the first line of defence is Canada. The security of Canadian air space is clearly vital to the security of the United States, particularly now, that the Soviet air force has acquired a stand-off capability of several hundred miles. The success of an American air defence against a Soviet attack would be absolutely dependent on the prior defence of Canadian air space.

It must be recognized also that France maintains a much higher level of defence expenditure than Canada, 3.1% of GNP as compared to the 1.8% that Canada spends. More-