

This draft resolution is in no sense a declaration of war -- limited or unlimited -- against China. It is in no sense, as I understand it, a declaration of desire or intention to destroy the Chinese Communist revolution or overthrow the regime in Peking. If it were, my Government would not support it. When one considers the provocation offered by the People's Republic of China and the military action it has taken -- and we are concerned only with that action and not with any policy which may have inspired it -- one cannot even call this draft resolution a hostile declaration against the Chinese people or claim that it shuts the door finally against negotiations. It is, in the first place, a firm call to the Peking Government to desist from participation in aggression and, in the second place, a promise of peaceful settlement if it does.

I am aware of the fear expressed by certain members of this Committee that the consequences of paragraph 3 would, as Sir Benegal Rau said the other day, create an atmosphere in which further negotiation would be impossible. We would be distressed, on our part, if this should be the case, and we are most anxious, as I have already said, that negotiations continue if there is any possibility of their being successful. We ask ourselves, however, what could the Peking Government expect? They know the views of the United Nations on the aggression already committed in Korea, but in spite of this fact, they have joined in that aggression, claiming that we, the United Nations, are the aggressors. We have asked them to withdraw, and they have refused to stop killing members of the United Nations forces. So I find it rather difficult to believe that they would be shocked or surprised by our conclusion that they are participating in aggression. What else could we decide once we had to make the decision? We cannot, after all, encourage their Korean aggression by giving them cause to believe that we are the aggressors or that we no longer distinguish between right and wrong. It may still be that the Chinese consider that they are engaged not in aggression, but in self-defence; that they are so imprisoned by their own dogma and their isolation, so influenced by bad advice and misled by wrong information, that they do not understand the intentions of the United Nations in general and of the United States in particular. We have recognized, and we should, I think, still recognize, this possibility and be prepared to give even further assurances of our intentions if we are given an opportunity to do so. But it can hardly be said that we have not already tried with great patience to understand the motives of the People's Republic of China and to explain ours to them. They have been given every chance to explain why they should not be considered as having participated in aggression, and they should know by now that we have taken every possible mitigating factor into consideration.

The question now arises: If we pass this draft resolution -- and this has a bearing on remarks I made a few moments ago about passing draft resolutions without careful consideration of their consequences or without giving the impression that we are going to do more about them than in fact we are -- what do we do then to continue our efforts to restrain the aggression which is taking place in Korea? This question cannot be easily or quickly answered. The Committee, which is proposed in