

they accuse them of aggression in continuing the war? If those countries had stopped fighting at that time, would the Soviet Union have been stronger to withstand the attack from Hitler, who would then have been in virtual domination of all of Western Europe, an attack which Mr. Vishinsky assures us the rulers of Moscow knew was coming? If they did know it, why did they spurn all the attempts made by the United Kingdom Government to warn them of their danger as efforts to divide them from their friends of that moment, the Nazis?

In our view, Mr. Vishinsky's version of the history of that period will not stand even the most superficial analysis, and his account of what happened in Korea in June 1950 -- and that also has a very immediate connection with our draft resolution -- seems to us to be equally flimsy and to fall to pieces at the slightest examination. He insisted yesterday, as he has insisted before, that it was the Soviet Union which tried to bring about a cease-fire in Korea in order to stop the war, and that it was the United States of America which did not permit this pacific solution.

I do not need to remind the General Assembly of some elementary facts. On June 25, after North Korean forces had crossed the 38th parallel and were streaming south with armoured columns, the Security Council met to consider a report from its Commission on Korea which had confirmed those facts, and it was the Security Council on that day, and not the Soviet Union, which asked for a cease-fire and called on the North Korean forces to withdraw beyond, or to, the 38th parallel. That was a splendid opportunity for the Soviet Union to support an appeal to cease fire.

Did the Soviet Union support the Security Council in its efforts to stop the war, or did it encourage the forces of North Korea, which were then triumphantly advancing? So far as I am aware, there was no whisper of support from the Soviet Union at that moment for the Security Council's appeal to cease fire. And what was the reason? Possibly, as we have not had a reason from the Soviet Union delegation, I might suggest an answer.

The Soviet Union may have refused to support the Security Council's call for a cease-fire at that time because then the North Korean forces were enjoying the first fruits of aggression and were advancing pell-mell down the peninsula. The interest of the Soviet Union in a cease-fire bloomed later. They were not early advocates of this idea, as Mr. Vishinsky would have us believe, but rather, their interest was expressed later, on August 1 when they called for a cease-fire. At a time when their friends were in possession of most of Korea and the brave and embattled forces of the Republic of Korea, of the United States, and of other Members of the United Nations stood at bay, waiting until United Nations forces should have gathered sufficient strength to take the offensive, then, and then only, did the Soviet Union suddenly become pacific and realize the great advantages of a cease-fire.

The history of this is of importance only insofar as it helps us to meet the future, as we are attempting to do in this resolution. Let us admit that all of us, nations and individuals, made mistakes in the dismal thirties. But some of those mistakes we do not intend to repeat if we can avoid it. We are not going to repeat the mistakes of the thirties