

and others, in the 1920s and 1930s, who sought to intervene in old world conflicts on behalf of liberal-rationality and the universalising logic of global capitalism. There is a more than a hint here also of the (broadly) Hegelian progressivism intrinsic to Fukuyama's post-Cold War celebration of the victory of the 'West' - a victory proclaimed in the name of an increasingly homogenised world order. (Fukuyama, 1992)

This is not to suggest that Evans' perspective is 'idealist' in the traditional sense of the term in IR - i.e. as the dichotomised opposite of realism. Rather, the perspective outlined in Cooperating for Peace is idealist in the way that *realism always was*. It is ontologically idealist in the way it frames its metaphysical subjects and objects. It is analytically and politically idealist in the same way that realism has been since the late 1930s when it, paradoxically, proclaimed itself the successor to Wilsonian utopianism. This paradox of course is startlingly clear in another influential work of the English School in Australia, E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis (1964) which attacked interwar idealism on the basis that its particularistic interpretation of global reality blinded its advocates to the fact that it was an interpretation - primarily a US interpretation - that did not necessarily describe the reality of a world in which the interests of huge numbers of people were not served by Western, liberal-rationalist and market centred logic.⁴⁶

One need not reject Carr's insightful critique of the Wilsonian position to recognise the paradox of it, and of realism generally, in its promotion of the same particularistic-cum-universalistic scenario since the end of WW2. And while circumstances dictated that the realist universalist pursuit be represented in less utopian terms than that of its great modern rival (global Socialism-as-reality) it is no great surprise that the 1990s has seen a more explicit assertion of realist concerns for a Western led convergence in world affairs. And this is precisely the new/old context in which Evans frames Australia's new security perspectives in Cooperating For Peace. But this is where the problems of a new/old mind-set begins to bite in policy terms, particularly on the issue of how the process of global convergence, integral to Australia's security agenda, *actually works* in everyday practice.

Is it, in this context, really just a matter of states and other actors "beginning to learn" that their best interests are advanced not by a culture of conflict, but by a culture of cooperation." as Evans suggests?. Is the post-Cold War global arena really awash with rational-actors celebrating a "culture of cooperation" based upon liberal-

⁴⁶See E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London: Macmillan 1964) Chs. 3-4