

Agreement or a separate accord on the management entity would lay out the procedures, benchmarks included, for a transfer of donor control that signified confidence in the long-term sustainability of disposition.

So the vision here is for a management entity which very largely self-liquidates around the time when disposition begins. There could therefore be some small savings in the cost of the Corporation over the life of the programme. Under the base case scenario, all the research and design, licensing and regulatory, and construction work would have been done seven or eight years into the endeavour.<sup>11</sup> Ten years in and thereafter to the end, financial support would still be required, but otherwise disposition would consist very largely of routine Russian processing, transportation, and storage operations.

We could therefore be thinking of benchmarks for full transfer of control over technical matters to the Russian Federation ten years from the start of the programme. To all but get out of business, the MMC would need not only to manage the crucial work of disposition in Russia. It would also have to support the Russian Federation in a decade's worth of cooperative enculturation. This it would do as part of its total effort to run the programme and strengthen it against disability in a setting quite different from that normally encountered by donor-country nuclear industries.

Enculturation, we've seen, results in the acquisition of beliefs and practices which serve to alter one's identity and sense of belonging. Our interest is very obviously not in the enculturation of Russia in general, but in those beliefs and practices which are capable of altering Russia's sense of self for the particular purpose of sustained WGPu disposition. Three broad areas in which disposition could benefit have already been identified: political and business culture and practice; regulation; and representation of civil society in the Russian policy process. There are opportunities for an MMC to make a difference for long-term sustainability in all three. The Corporation would take them up not in a spirit of social work, but in an aggressive effort to create preconditions for its own success.

In the course of a decade or more the MMC's managers should be able to make an impression on Russia's nuclear industry and its values and practices. After all, they would be contracting, monitoring, and consulting on quality and performance evaluations for every piece of disposition-related work. Indeed, the appearance of the MMC on the scene in Russia could mark the onset of a new and exemplary emphasis on international competitiveness in the performance of the nuclear industry there. It could be an aim of the MMC to support the emergence of a strong, commercially-minded Minatom whose success was understood to depend on demonstrated concern for the environment and safety.

Others will know far better than I what should be emphasized and how. Suppose, however, that quality assurance were the key. The message would be evident in the actions of the Corporation's staff. It would go to senior managers in Russian industry, and on down for all aspects of production and service including safety and environmental protection. To the degree

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<sup>11</sup> The mission and character of the MMC would of course vary with the approach taken to disposition: simpler but still fairly imposing if export-only were chosen; more complex and time-consuming if a new reactor were to be built in Russia. For simplicity's sake we hold here to the base case or Agreement scenario.