

the United Nations Disarmament Commission, Paragraph 2(c), calling for a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The essence of the United States draft treaty -- which is, of course, available to the Committee as an attachment to the Report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (A/5986) -- is contained in the words of Article I:

"Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to ... take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons."

The wording of Article II imposes a similar obligation on the non-nuclear states party to the treaty.

On 24 September of this year, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty on non-proliferation. The spokesmen of the United States and the Soviet Union, at our last meeting, explained the provisions of their respective draft treaties, so I shall confine my remarks in this regard to examining the divergencies between what the non-aligned memorandum called "the various approaches for an appropriate or adequate treaty" which these two documents reveal.

If we compare the respective first articles in the two drafts, which are intended to specify the undertakings of the nuclear powers party to the treaty, we find the following. The Soviet Union draft is intended not only to prevent any nation emerging as a new independent nuclear power -- as the United States draft does -- but it also is intended to prevent, as we understand it, any new organization being set up within an alliance or other group of states with the independent power to use nuclear weapons. It further would appear designed to prohibit certain defensive arrangements which now exist within the NATO alliance.

Under these existing arrangements, certain nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles of limited range in the hands of allies of the United States could be used to deliver nuclear weapons in order to repel aggression. The nuclear weapons, however, are kept under the close custody of United States personnel only. Their use would require both a decision by the other government that it wished to use the weapons, and a separate decision by the United States Government to release weapons from its own custody for use by that other government. These arrangements, which, of course, are entirely defensive in character, thus ensure that the United States retains not only the right but also the physical means to prevent the use of such weapons and, accordingly, these arrangements in no way constitute proliferation.

If these arrangements were abolished, moreover, it would be of one-sided advantage to the Soviet Union and its allies. It would weaken NATO defences, with no corresponding reduction of the immense destructive potentiality of the nuclear weapons with their means of delivery possessed by the Soviet Union. Thus the proposal set out in treaty language in Article I of the U.S.S.R. draft would contravene the principle for disarmament negotiations, jointly agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union and endorsed by the General Assembly in Resolution 1722 (XVI), that no measure of disarmament should confer a military advantage on any state or group of states. It seems clear that, in its present form, this provision of the Soviet Union draft does not constitute a suitable basis for negotiation.