Council action and that the conflicts are somehow outside world politics.³² These discursive manoeuvres blur the fact that the Security Council makes the *political* choice to become involved in internal disputes rather than that it has suddenly become obliged to. The narrative of localized ethnic conflicts also masks the many ways in which global networks of power are responsible for the contemporary disputes which result in various ways from colonialism, neocolonialism, the Cold War itself and, in the current context, the globalization of capital which is deepening the gender, class and race-based disparities in the global distribution of wealth.

Peacekeeping was given a central role in thenew paradigm of global insecurity, at least initially. The Cold War rules of engagement for peacekeeping, which required consensus, impartiality and abstaining from the use of force were officially reaffirmed³³ and underwrote the initial public enthusiasm and moral authority that peacekeepers enjoyed. However, despite their retention, the Cold War peacekeeping principles have been seriously compromised in a number of ways. For example, the Security Council has stretched the principle of the non-use of force except in self-defence beyond recognition to include defence of the humanitarian goals of peacekeeping mandates as, for example, in Bosnia³⁴ and Somalia.³⁵ As a result, peacekeepers have used force in efforts to variously protect humanitarian relief operations, to protect civilians in areas designated as safe havens and to prompt the parties to move more quickly towards national reconciliation. The Security Council mandate regarding Haiti also included a confusion of chapter VI and chapter VII

³² Peter Rosenblum, "Save The Tribunals: Salvage the Movement, a Response to Makau Mutua" (1997) 11 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 189, 193

^{(1997) 11} Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 189, 193.

33 Boutros Boutros Ghali reaffirmed these principles in 1995. See Supplement, above n 27, para 33.

34 Berdal, above n 30, 81. SC Res 836, UN SCOR, 48th Sess, UN Doc S/RES/836 (1993) para 9.

³⁵ SC Res 794, UN SCOR, 47th Sess, 2-4, UN Doc S/RES/794 (1992); SC Res 814, UN SCOR, 48th Sess, 1, UN Doc S/RES/814 (1993).