

even when implemented, such agreements rarely stand the test of time.⁹⁴ Leaders may be wary of a trap and seek to avoid any agreement which constrains their exercise of power. Anticipating electoral victories both Charles Taylor in Liberia and Jonas Savimbi in Angola objected to any political compromises which might limit their post-election power.⁹⁵ Even the voting electorate may prefer to give a disproportionate share of power to one party rather than have a weak, if reconciled, government. Despite Taylor's implication in atrocities during the civil war of the early 1990s, many ordinary Liberians also worried that a power-sharing pact and broad-based government would result in a weak regime not unlike those under which they had lived for the previous six years.⁹⁶

Economic Development

Good governance must be supplemented by other measures which diminish the importance of the state or at least the necessity of controlling government. Not only does a generalized effort toward economic development increase the standard of living for all citizens but it also reduces the need to possess weaponry. Moreover, it helps people maintain their security even if they do not wield political or military power. Genuine development reduces the stakes in the political game and leaves individuals with several favourable options to consider both within and without the government. Alleviating the misery of the displaced, providing access to employment, land, health care and education are important security-building measures which can help deter a return to violence.⁹⁷

Microdisarmament

Micro-disarmament refers not only to the type of weapons which are involved but also to the *individual* level at which disarmament is to take place. An obvious problem in conflict resolution in many African countries is that weapons which are owned by individuals for domestic protection or as part of a larger sentinel system, can also be used for killing in times of conflict and war. However, the multiple roles of such weaponry – as weapons of war, as a right of manhood, and as a legitimate means of domestic self-defense or even a legitimate means of livelihood – make

⁹⁴ See Ian S. Spears, "Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power," *Third World Quarterly* 21(1) (2000).

⁹⁵ Initially, following the signing of the 1994 Lusaka Accord, Jonas Savimbi appeared amenable to a power-sharing agreement. But according to one UNITA representative, Savimbi was only willing to take part in such a government provided "as long as it was not simply to cut ribbons." Muekalia interview with the author. Indeed, governments must strike a difficult balance between offering a substantial enough portion of power to satisfy an adversary and maintaining control.

⁹⁶ Lyons, p. 48.

⁹⁷ Stedman and Rothchild, pp. 32-3.