

terms of the priorities that have been established, and of the cost-effectiveness and the marginal return of various options. With limited resources available for Canadian defence needs, it is desirable to have versatile forces and multi-purpose equipment rather than a high degree of specialization. Multiple-tasking is also necessary in order to make most efficient use of available resources.

#### TERRITORIAL CONTROL

The Government's object is to continue effective occupation of Canadian territory, and to maintain surveillance and control capability to the extent necessary to safeguard national interests in all Canadian territory, air-space and waters off the coast over which the country exercises sovereignty or jurisdiction. Civil departments of government already have specific responsibilities in many instances for regulating activity in Canadian territory but assign to the Department of National Defence ultimate responsibility to ensure protection of Canadian sovereignty and security; thus adequate general Canadian surveillance and control capability exists. Where required by potential challenges to Canada's interests, the armed forces will carry out surveillance and exercise control in those areas not covered by the civil departments, or in which the latter require assistance.

Civil disorder should normally be contained by civil authorities and sufficient police forces should be maintained for this purpose. Nevertheless, unforeseen emergencies may arise, or coincident outbreaks of violence may create demands, for which it would not be feasible for the civil authorities to remain constantly prepared in normal times. In such circumstances civil authorities should be able to rely on timely assistance from the Canadian armed forces.

#### CO-OPERATION WITH UNITED STATES

The only direct military threat to Canada's national security is that coincident with a strategic nuclear attack on North America. The aim is to prevent such a situation from occurring. Co-operation with U.S. forces in North American defence will remain essential as long as joint Canada-U.S. security depends on strategic military balance. The principle of co-operation with the U.S. is the imperative of sovereignty and security. Canada has no plans for involvement in the American Anti-Ballistic Missile system.

The greater part of Canada's maritime forces can operate interchangeably between roles of national surveillance and control and North American defence. Although anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability will be maintained as part of maritime general purpose capabilities, the present degree of emphasis on ASW directed against submarine-launch ballistic-missile (SLBM) submarines will be reduced in favour of re-orienting Canada's maritime forces, with the long-term objective of providing more versatile general-purpose capability responsive to the broad range of national maritime requirements.

#### BOMARC TO GO

Although the importance of the Soviet strategic-bomber force has declined relative to ICBM/SLBM, surveillance and warning will continue to be required to prevent bombers from approaching North America undetected and to contribute to deterrence by precluding the Soviet Union from launching the bombers against North America before its missiles. It does not follow that full active bomber defence is required and, unless the strategic situation changes, Canada, while maintaining its interceptor force at the current level, intends to up-date its contribution to the active anti-bomber defences of North America only to the extent required for general control of Canadian air-space. *Bomarc* missiles in Canada will be retired. There is a continuing need for integration of operational control of the forces made available for air defence of Canada and the United States.

#### CANADA'S ROLE IN EUROPE

Canada's military role in NATO is directly related to deterrence of war, primarily in the sensitive European area but also in the North Atlantic region as a whole. Reduction in the level of Canada's force contribution in Europe is related to changes that have taken place both in Europe and in Canada over the last 20 years, but Canada adheres to the conception of collective security and intends to continue to station significant though reduced forces in Europe as part of the integrated force structure. The latter decision reflects the Government's judgment that Canadian security continues to be bound up with that of Western Europe. Canada's contribution of forces in Europe assures it a voice in important political negotiations in progress or in prospect, designed to lead to a resolution of some of the tension-producing issues that persist from the Second World War. The community of interest deriving from NATO membership should have a positive effect on the preservation of trading relations with Western Europe.

Canada is prepared to agree that Canadian training facilities be made available for the training of forces of other countries, subject to the principle that the costs of such training are borne by the country making use of the facilities.

Canadian forces stationed abroad will be compatible with those based in Canada. Land forces will be equipped so that they will be mobile and flexible in employment for a variety of general-purpose roles. The intention is to "reconfigure" the present interim land force in Europe. *Centurion* tanks will not be required in the new force. A light-tracked direct-fire support vehicle, which is "air-portable" in *Hercules* aircraft, will be provided. The only equipment which it will be necessary to retain that is not portable by Canadian air transport is self-propelled artillery. A force will be organized within the same numbers as the present ground force in Europe. Following termination of the nuclear attack role for the CF-104s in Europe at the end of 1971, the Government is pre-