examination a good case can be made for this method. 'Security first' really relates to **personal** security which, in turn, is essential to structural development. Provision of that personal security is a basic responsibility of government. It follows that the government must have the capacity to do that. The governments in the sub-region were strapped for resources, had competing demands for those that did exist, and needed external assistance.

Security assistance is always a sensitive subject, no more so than in Africa at this time. It is important then to highlight two other conclusions of the mission:

- that the assistance envisioned does not involve weaponry and the emphasis is on security forces other than the defence establishment; i.e., police, gendarmerie, national guard and customs officials, and

- that the assistance, from whatever source, needs oversight by a neutral authority.

Therefore the Mission made two sets of recommendations. The first comprised those actions that the individual governments might take on their own with minimal external assistance. The second comprised actions that might be taken or coordinated by the United Nations. The first recommendations included: improved internal controls and procedures, tightening up national legislation, and better training for the security forces.

Regarding action by the United Nations, it was clear that work needed to be done to obtain the **resources** to implement any recommendations. In that light the UN intended, first, to coordinate closely with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), whose mandate to assist in human security and good governance might be the vehicle for the delivery of these recommendations, and, second, interact with major donor states who are active, or wish to be active, in the sub-region and solicit their support for this 'security first' approach.

In sum, the second set of recommendations included fostering a sub-regional approach, arrangements for monitoring and supervision, and assistance in training, developing confidence-building measures, and standardizing legislation and customs procedures.

Building on those recommendations, the UN Department of Political Affairs and the UNDP established a small team in Bamako to coordinate action on the recommendations and, for Mali and Niger, to assist in the disarmament,