

" The second principle which, in our opinion, should guide the actions of the Security Council is that to the greatest extent possible the responsibility for solving a political problem should be left with the people who are immediately affected by it. In respect of Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir, for instance, it is still the case that the parties directly concerned and the people who live in the area must seek to determine the measures by which peace will be maintained in these areas. This is not only the most practical principle of action, it revives and strengthens a sense of responsibility at the point where it is most vital to healthy political life, and it sets the objectives of an agreed, rather than an imposed solution.

" The third general principle which seems to us to have emerged is that the Security Council should in all cases immediately concentrate its influence on putting an end to hostilities or disorders whenever they occur. By insisting on this principle, and by insisting equally that fighting shall be stopped without prejudice to the ultimate political solution, the Security Council has been on strong ground. It has not, of course, been able to command complete obedience. Fighting has recurred even in areas where a firm truce seemed to have been established, and it has not been possible to guarantee absolutely that the ultimate outcome of a dispute would not be affected by the military action which had taken place. In general, however, the primary concern of the Security Council, that peace should be kept while negotiations proceed, has been respected and has contributed materially to the progress which has been made in the settlement of disputes. The moral authority of our world organization--which seems to be all that it is now permitted to have--is no slight thing, and no state, great or small, lightly disregards its decisions".

24. If the United Nations had a number of limitations affecting its chances of success in dealing with a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, there were grounds for refusing to consider that it had completely failed and should therefore no longer command general support. In the first place, as the report, "Canada and the United Nations, 1948", pointed out, the United Nations was a useful forum in which public opinion could express itself and in this way become better informed of the dangers to peace. It was also a permanent table around which representatives of nearly all states could meet. Secondly, as members of the Government and the Department were to point out from time to time, the United Nations was a bridge or means of contact between the Cominform and non-Cominform states. When direct negotiations over the Berlin crisis broke down, for example, the United Nations provided an opportunity for further negotiations. As Mr. Pearson was to put it in a speech before the Canadian Bar Association, as late as March 13, 1951, "this precedent alone would be enough to warrant the hope that if the Soviet Union were convinced that ... it could not achieve its objectives by force it might secure through the United Nations at least a temporary accommodation with the countries of the West". Thirdly, the United Nations had also shown its usefulness in promoting co-operation and maintaining peace. It is true that, as already mentioned, the issues it had met successfully were on the periphery of the basic divisions between East and West, but the fact that they had not developed into war clearly demonstrated that within limited fields the United Nations could provide the means whereby such disputes could be resolved by negotiation