

seek, at home or abroad. Using these indicators, Huth and Russett designate thirty-one of their cases as deterrence successes and twenty-three as failures in their 1984 collection and ten additional successes and three failures in their 1988 collection. Of their ten cases that we believe meet the criteria of extended immediate deterrence, we code three as successes and eight as failures (one compound case qualifies as a success and as a failure).

George and Smoke are much more sensitive to the possibility of spurious deterrence success. They have written detailed analyses of all their cases in which they examine the motives of the initiators of all the deterrence challenges in their collection. Readers may accept or reject their interpretations of a challenger's intentions, but the evidence and reasoning behind their coding decisions are explicit. Moreover, George and Smoke readily admit that their analysis cannot be precise because all their evidence about Chinese and Soviet intentions is "indirect and circumstantial."<sup>67</sup>

The coding of cases by George and Smoke hinges on their interpretation of initiators' goals. The success or failure of deterrence will be partial or complete, depending on what the initiator wanted to accomplish. George and Smoke do not try to mask this difficulty; they acknowledge that their conclusions must remain provisional or even speculative.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, more recent evidence and analyses have called into question the coding of a number of their cases.

Two such cases are the Taiwan Straits crises of 1954-55 and 1958. In both crises, the People's Republic of China (PRC) shelled the offshore islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Matzu, occupied by Nationalist Chinese forces. Although the PRC occupied Yijiangshan and the Tachen islands in January and February 1955, they made no attempt to invade Quemoy and Matzu. In 1955 and again in 1958, the

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<sup>67</sup> In their analysis, George and Smoke stated that, given the incompleteness of the available evidence, the scoring of cases could only be provisional. When and if new evidence became available, cases might have to be recoded or eliminated. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, p.535.

<sup>68</sup> George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, p.527.