

to replace this concept with an even more dangerous one.”²⁶

For the Western non-nuclear powers, who were themselves doubtful about the spectre of strategic defences, the shifting strategic perceptions and diplomatic alignments within the Group of 21 were on the whole salutary developments. At a very informal level new allies were to be found among the more moderate neutral and non-aligned countries (NNA). These states moved toward the incrementalist arms control approach, focussing more on practicable regimes for chemical weapons and rather than comprehensive bans and nuclear disarmament schemes. In light of the verification and compliance dilemmas afflicting the superpower arms control relationship, a very small number of Third World states began to subscribe to the Western “technical” approach to arms control. A shared aim of the Western states and these Third World moderates was to catalyze superpower agreement through the CD, by strengthening the technical bases for adequate verification measures.

This limited convergence of Western and moderate NNA arms control approaches would suggest that the Geneva forum has done its best work to date in the pre-negotiation sphere. The work of the CD in this sense can best be understood as an important part of a broader international arms control process: the creation of norms or understandings between states with respect to the importance of verification, and the military/strategic logic of stabilizing arms control measures. The “norm creation” role of the CD is to be distinguished from its negotiating or “regime creation” role which, while it has undergone a renaissance of late, remains problematic for the Geneva body because of the intractability of the issues on its negotiating agenda.²⁷ Yet it is questionable whether the CD, in its urgent quest for successes on the treaty or regime creation front, can rest content for the near future with a less visible norm creation role. It is also questionable whether the CD, in pursuing this latter role, has had a serious impact upon the strategic and policy-making environments which lie beyond Geneva.

²⁶ CD/PV. 337.

²⁷ On the norm creation role of the CD see Dahlitz, *Nuclear Arms Control*, pp. 44-73, and Robert Carocciolo, “Main Issues in the Disarmament Negotiations,” in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf, eds. *The Dynamics of the Arms Race*, London: Halstead Press, 1975, p. 274. On the concept of regime creation see Platias and Rydell, “International Security Regimes,” p. 273.