

The facility will not have the right staff or instruments to carry out the analysis.

Lastly, it should be borne in mind, that although "in situ" analysis is very convenient, qualitative analyses undertaken under such conditions cannot be very reliable. It is preferable to take the samples to a laboratory and to analyse them there.

4.8 Photographs

The taking of photographs is one of the most delicate aspects of the security of the facility during the inspection and it must be ensured that it does not represent a breach of that security. For this reason, it is advisable that:

Photographs should be taken only of the documents or equipment that are needed as evidence in order to resolve a difference in interpretation;

In order to avoid unauthorized shots, photographs should be taken by the escort team at the request of the inspection team. Accordingly, the inspection team should not carry either still or video cameras;

The photographs that are taken should be made in two copies for the inspection and escort teams and should permit immediate verification, for which reason they should be of the instantaneous development type;

All the photographs taken should be attached to the inspection report and should be signed by the leaders of the inspection and escort teams, with an indication of the date, time and place of their taking and a brief description of what they show;

For the use of flash units in the taking of photographs, account should be taken of the safety regulations at the facility.

4.9 Reliability of challenge inspections

Recourse by a State party to the future Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons to the challenging of another State party before the Organization on the basis of reasonable evidence entails a definite political risk deriving from, inter alia, the fundamental limitations of such inspection at a party's request.

Challenge inspection has, indeed, a conceptual limitation that derives from its nature, by virtue whereof there can only be certainty as to its result if the latter is positive, that is, if evidence is found of the current or past presence of chemical weapons.

It is obvious that proof of non-presence, however exhaustive the operation may be, always leaves room for doubt; hence, also, the fundamental differences proven by the experts of the Spanish armed forces between this