



# The Volunteer Review

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### A LANCE FOR BYRON.

One till, in charity; this hideous charge,  
Where the Ho truth, should never have been  
uttered;  
For death had set life's prisoners at large,  
And Time forgot what jealously had muttered;  
And our pure English homes must not be drenched  
Heedlessly thus with pestilential vapours,  
That classic Byron's glory may be quenched  
In vileness filtered through the posts and papers;  
And fifty years had past; and all who knew,  
Sinners and sinned against, long since departed;  
And nothing could be sure, as false or true,  
About the guilty and the broken-hearted.  
But—to traduce the dead, who may not speak,  
Through wormed-out confidence of the dying,  
And, haply, on the innocent to wreak  
A wife's revenge, through author-craft, in  
lying—  
Demurely to convict of horrid crime  
(Impossible alike of proof or answer)  
A Name till now a treasure for all time,  
But just found out, forsooth, a moral cancer,—  
To blacken his "sweet sister," long in bliss  
By calumnies incredible and hateful—  
O treacherous "friend" of that false "wife."—Is  
this  
A deed for which to thee the world is grateful?  
No! we denounce thee: by that widow's bed  
Thou sattest, meanly, pruriently prying,  
Bribed by a scribbler's fee to turn the dead,  
And blab the sunderous secrets of the dying!  
MARTIN F. TUPPER.

### THE REVOLT

OF THE

British American Colonies,

1764-84.

CHAPTER XXI.

The preceding narrative will prove what has already been asserted that Howe was not a General, and the same remark will apply to Washington—both men being judged by the scientific and practical laws of warfare—the professional student will easily perceive the constant succession of errors into which both unhesitatingly plunged, with this difference that Washington's alacrity in part atoned for his mistakes, while Howe's stupidity aggravated his blunders. Having placed himself on the communications of the United States army and completely severed the Eastern from the Middle Colonies, it was only necessary to hold the positions acquired till severe weather set in when that army must necessarily disband itself, and this would have compelled the submission of the revolted

Provinces. But Gen. Howe thought otherwise, and falling back from White Plains proceeded to invest Fort Washington on the Island of New York, thus restoring to the beaten troops of Congress the communications with Connecticut, from which their supplies were drawn.

When Washington had left New York he left a strong garrison in Fort Washington, and the moment Howe's troops fell back he crossed the Hudson with a large division of his army to Fort Lee on its right bank and thus covered the road to Philadelphia.

With such an enterprising naval officer as Black Dick (Lord Howe) it is a matter of inexplicable mystery why the Hudson was left open to a whale boat or a bark canoe as high as Albany, especially as a splendid fleet was lying in the harbor of New York.

An attack on the land side with a loss of 800 men in killed and wounded placed Fort Washington in the hands of the British, the loss to the United States was over 3,000 men in killed, wounded and prisoners. The fleet did not co-operate, although the works could have been easily laid open by their fire. Washington lost probably a large number of men, Howe sacrificed his for an advantage which would have accrued to him by famine.

On the 18th November Lord Cornwallis crossed the Hudson at the head of a strong division of 6,000 men and landed at Closter, eight miles above Fort Lee, marching rapidly on that position he surprised the garrison, who made their escape in confusion, leaving behind them their baggage, stores and artillery.

Washington with the main army of Congress were encamped at Hakensack, five miles in the rear of Fort Lee, and it is more than probable that if Lord Cornwallis had at once pushed forward he would have captured both General and army, so thoroughly demoralized had the latter become, but celerity of movement was not a necessary qualification for command in the British service in those days, therefore as Cornwallis leisurely advanced Washington as deliberately fell back, his whole force reduced to three or four thousand indisciplined and ill provided men.

It was evident now that the cause of Congress was at its lowest ebb—all was confusion. The only force between the English General and Philadelphia, their last and chief strong hold, was Washington's army and that beaten, dispirited, and disorganised, was shut up between the Hakensack and Delaware, a distance of some eighty miles, which Cornwallis occupied *three weeks* in passing over. On the 8th of December Washington and his dispirited troops arrived at Trenton and at once crossed the Delaware, thus putting that river between him and the English troops, who had occupied successively Newark, Brunswick, Princeton and Trenton, and so well timed were the movements that the music of the advancing and retreating bands could be easily heard by both parties, Cornwallis' advance marching into Trenton as the last boat load of Washington's soldiers were leaving it.

It has been ascertained that Cornwallis' procrastination was due to Howe's express orders, else his conduct would be as inexplicable as that Sphynx of tacticians was; he halted a week at Brunswick with Washington's troops, heavy artillery and baggage at Princeton, seventeen, and Trenton on the Delaware, twenty-nine miles distant. Washington had left Princetown one hour before Cornwallis entered, the latter halted there for seventeen hours as if to show how he could calculate the exact time it would take the former to get his men across the Delaware.

The British troops were placed in winter cantonments at Trenton, Bordenton, Princeton, Brunswick, and in small detachments throughout New Jersey. Trenton, the most important, being occupied by Colonel Halle with 1,200 Hessians, while Bordenton, White Horse and Burlington were maintained by 2,000 Hessians under Colonel Donop. The principle followed being that of making the posts nearest headquarters and the furthest from danger the strongest, while those in front of the enemy were the weakest, and the troops were so scattered that one post or division could not succor or support the other. The fourteen posts were not covered by redoubt, fort or intrenchment, and Wash-