

terests become committed and before deployment complicates inspection.

Despite recurring problems with bargaining chips, which have really never been cashed, a substantial number of weapon systems have in recent years been supported on the ground that they would provide effective bargaining counters in negotiations with the Soviets. Such arguments have been made by Pentagon and Administration officials with respect to proposals for *Trident*, the B-1 bomber, NCA defence, the development of an advanced airborne command post, site defence, the Manoeuvring Re-entry Vehicle, and higher-yield and more accurate missiles. On August 19, 1975, President Ford also attempted to pressure the Soviets into an agreement on SALT when he suggested that the strategic-arms budget would have to be increased by \$2.8 billion if agreement were not reached.

According to some authorities, the SS-9 represented an effort by the U.S.S.R. to create its own bargaining chip. Also the rapidity with which the Soviet Union rushed into development of the SS-16-through-SS-20 series is suggestive of a desire to increase its bargaining position during SALT II. The same can be said of the scheduling of a series of ICBM tests at the end of May 1972, just as SALT I was signed, and further tests conducted on the eve of the resumption of the SALT talks on February 20, 1974, following a long delay in negotiations.

Increase of fear

Bargaining chips tend to increase fear on the part of the adversary, and the traditional reaction is one of responding in kind. To have either side emphasize bargaining chips makes it more difficult for the moderates in the other country to plead for realistic arms restraint. Ammunition is merely provided for the hawks to press for higher defence budgets and to sabotage any effort towards arms reduction.

On the whole, bargaining chips have been costly, but if it could be shown that partial agreements such as those reached in SALT had stimulated more extensive reductions of armaments, they would be worth the price. Unfortunately, this does not seem to have been the case. Instead, the agreements to date have tended to generate increased suspicion and have actually slowed down the momentum towards more significant agreements.

Suspicion about possible evasions of an arms-control agreement is likely to be pervasive in a world that is high in threat-perception and heavily armed. Indeed, a state may be trapped by public pressures

Difficulties increased for moderates advocating arms restraint

its ex...
e *Sentinel* system as a bargaining chip
the upcoming SALT negotiations.
earlier arguments for the system as a pro-
tection against a possible nuclear strike
from China, as a device for countering an
accidental missile launching, and as a pro-
tection against a first strike, had all been
and wanting. The Nixon Administration
so used the bargaining-chip argument in
ing to sell its *Safeguard* ABM system.
the U.S. SALT negotiator, Gerard Smith,
nt so far as to send an urgent telegram
members of the Senate in August 1970
suggesting that a vote in favour of limiting
e *Safeguard* system to two sites would
detrimental to the outcome of SALT.
without such an intervention, the limit
ite likely would have passed. As it was,
e proposal failed by five votes.

edge
inter... if the threat of an ABM race were
inequ... enough to get the Soviet Union to
incre... to a ban on the ABM, the Nixon
Since... administration also sought to justify the
gh to as... IRV system as a hedge against the
te has... viet ABM. MIRV was to have made it
et such... ar to the Soviet Union that it would
ceptible... ver be able to provide an effective de-
amments... nce against a United States retaliatory
ike. It is interesting to note, however,
ave an... at there was no discussion of stopping
limiting... RV developments once agreement on
her gros... ABM was reached and, as indicated
of incre... MIRVing continues at a rapid pace.
et proj... Perhaps the best illustration of how
dures... military bargaining chip can force the
on syst... development of unneeded weapons and, in
ays form... impede the prospects of arms con-
troit fol... is found in the development of a
tageous... ise missile. According to John W. Fin-
y in an article published in the *New*
ork Times on January 21, 1976, it was
cretary of State Henry Kissinger who
rting... oposed that the Pentagon undertake de-
suffici... opment of long-range cruise missiles as
ilitary... bargaining chip for the SALT II negotia-
at yet... ns. According to Finney, Mr. Kissinger
such... w lamentations in private conversations that
have b... "didn't realize the Pentagon would fall
n of "love with cruise missiles". Similar sec-
ally... nd thoughts have been expressed by
oduction... retary Kissinger about the MIRV sys-
es press... n, which had earlier been sold as a
ts own... gaining chip but after production be-
rather... ne a serious obstacle to reaching agree-
ble out... nt because of the inspection problems
he exer... created. Kissinger is reported to have
ks has... d that he wished he "had thought
just suc... ough the implications of the MIRVed
he oth... rld more fully in 1968-70". The best
the fir... e to stop an arms race involving any
ohnson... pon system is before work begins on
s, prop... e weapon — at a time before vested in-