

on our part; others follow the dictates of the immaterial principle.

Without strict regard to metaphysical analysis, the faculties of the mind may be divided into the intellectual and moral faculties, and the faculty of taste. By the first, we apprehend the abstract relations of things, and the truth or falsehood of propositions; by the second, we discern the moral quality of actions, and derive the feeling of obligation; by the third, we appreciate the beauty and sublimity of art and of the material world. The body is the mere instrument of perception and action, while, at the same time, it forms the habitation of the spirit.

But our idea of man must be very defective, if we view him in an isolated capacity only, and contemplate his faculties and high endowments without reference to the great spiritual system of which he forms a part. As a member of such a system, he is a subject of moral law administered by the Legislator of the Universe. This law does not view him as an *autoteles*—a being whose end is himself—but as a being whose chief end is to glorify his Creator by the highest cultivation and active employment of those mental and moral faculties with which he is so munificently endowed. It ought not to be his aim to secure the greatest happiness and wealth possible for the present term of existence, but to fit himself for that world of which this forms but the vestibule. This is his high destiny. In order to accomplish this destiny, things must not be estimated according to their present importance, but according to their influence on his future well-being. The question, in regard to any pursuit, should be, How will it best promote that well-being?—not, How will it advance him in wealth? Thus things would assume their proper positions and due relations.

The subject, then, to be educated, is a being of wide relations, and of a destiny high as the glory of the Highest. Education is the instrument by which this being is fitted for the performance of the duties arising out of his relations, and assimilated, in some degree, to his high-born and fair original.

But of education there are two kinds. The one is the education of habits and particular faculties; the other, the development of the whole man. The former has reference to some professional calling, and is mistaken by many for true education. So far is this from the truth, as a profound philologist has well remarked, the more a man is educated professionally, the less is he educated as a man. Unacquainted with almost every branch of study not immediately connected with his profession, the furniture of his mind is incomplete. It resembles a room with a beautiful finish and costly paintings on one wall, and with nothing but raw plaster on the other. The mental development of such a man has no harmony, no symmetry of parts.

True education, in its largest sense, is the development of the whole man, physical, intellectual, and moral. It does not consist in Spartan exercises to fit one for successful rivalry in field-games and for high achievements in battle. It does not consist in training the memory at the expense of the judgment, nor in cultivating the esthetic part of our nature to the neglect of the intellectual; nor does it admit of developing the intellect without an attempt at a corresponding development of the moral powers; but it consists in the training and culture of all these, in presenting in one glow of associated beauty all the faculties of body and soul.

In this development education can employ no one instrument. There must be a system of means based upon a correct and philosophical view of the work to be performed. This work, in mental culture, is to teach

the mind how to use its faculties, how to reason correctly on any subject proposed for its consideration.

The method of the mind in reasoning is twofold, analysis and synthesis, or induction and deduction. The relations out of which all science is made up are also twofold—law and observation. A law is a rule of unconditional truth arrived at by the generalization of facts. These facts become matters of knowledge by observation.

“When we reason from the facts to the law, we call it analysis, or induction; when we reason from law to law, when from a known truth we seek to establish an unknown truth, we call it deduction, or synthesis. As, then, all science is made up of law and observation, of the idea and the facts, so all scientific reasoning is either induction or deduction. It is not possible, however, to teach inductive reasoning, or even to cultivate a habit of it directly. We all reason inductively every moment of our lives, but to reason inductively for the purposes of science belongs only to those whose minds are so constituted that they can see the resemblances in things which other men think unlike: in short, to those who have powers of original combination, and whom we term men of genius. If, therefore, we can impart by teaching deductive habits, education will have done its utmost towards the discipline of the reasoning faculties. When we speak of laws and ideas, we must not be understood as wishing to imply any thing more than general terms arrived at by real classification. About these general terms and these alone is deductive reason conversant, so that the method of mind, which is the object of education, is nothing but the method of language. Hence, if there is any way of imparting to the mind deductive habits, it must be by teaching the method of language, and this discipline has in fact been adopted in all the more enlightened periods of the existence of man. It will be remembered, in this method of language, it is not the words, but the arrangement of them, which is the object of study, and thus the method of language is independent of the conventional significations of particular words: it is of no country and of no age, but is as universal as the general mind of man. For these reasons we assert that the method of language, one of the branches of philology, must always be, as it has been, the basis of education, or humanity as such, that is, of the discipline of the human mind.”*

Language, moreover, is the instrument of thought: it forms the medium of communication between one mind and another; it is important, then, that the instrument be skilfully handled, that the medium be clear and unobstructed as possible. But this can only be accomplished by a careful study of the nature and powers of the instrument itself.

All this may be admitted, and still it may be asked, What bearing has it upon the study of the Latin and Greek Classics? Why may not a modern language, such as the English, the German, or the French, accomplish all the ends of philological training?

A dead language the phenomena of which are fixed, has a decided advantage over a living one, which is subject to perpetual change. Its permanence of form affords us better opportunities for philological anatomy and for gaining fixed ideas of the general analogy of language. Of all dead languages, the Latin and the Greek, with the exception, perhaps, of the Sanscrit, have attained to the greatest perfection of grammatical structure, and to the highest degree of literary culture. No dead language possesses a literature so rich and

* Donaldson's New Cratylus, pp. 7, 8, Cambridge.