

DOMINION WILL CONTROL SITUATION

OUTLOOK FOR IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY

Ex-Premier Greenway Accepts Leadership of Manitoba Liberal Party—Coal Famine in Ontario.

Montreal, Dec. 11.—An important meeting of the Dominion Iron & Steel Company's directors was held here to-day. At the close it was announced that James Ross hereafter would take a more active part in the management of the company, practically replacing H. M. Whitney in the financial management as he did a short time ago in the management of the Dominion Coal Company. Mr. Ross announced that he had just returned from a trip to the leading steel manufacturing centres of the United States and felt that nothing could prevent the Dominion Steel Company from commanding the situation, both in pig iron and steel, on the American continent. He also announced that the manufacture of steel would begin early next month, and that the output had been sold in advance at remunerative prices. Messrs. Ross, Cox and other Canadian shareholders have largely increased their holdings recently and the company is becoming Canadian in ownership as well as location. Coming to the Coast.

The Duke of Newcastle, son of the Duke who accompanied the Prince of Wales to Montreal in 1861, passed through the city this evening en route to the Pacific coast. He is in poor health and will spend three weeks in Banff and some time in British Columbia.

Liberal Leader. Winnipeg, Dec. 11.—At the provincial Liberal convention this afternoon there was a very large attendance, many being unable to gain entrance to the hall. A resolution endorsing ex-Premier Greenway as leader of the party in Manitoba was spoken to by Senator Watson, T. G. Norris, Isaac Campbell and other prominent Liberals. Mr. Greenway replied at length and accepted the leadership, but warned the party that he was not as active as in former years, having stood 22 years of hard fighting in politics. The announcement of Mr. Greenway's acceptance was received with loud applause. This evening the convention was addressed by Hon. Mr. Sifton, A. C. Fraser and others.

Shortage of Coal. Toronto, Dec. 11.—Owing to shortage of cars and congestion of traffic at Pittsburg and Buffalo, there is a soft coal and coke famine in Ontario. One foundry in Hamilton has been compelled to close down. Toronto manufacturers will be able to keep open, as a supply of hard coal is obtainable.

Sudden Death. St. John, N. B., Dec. 11.—Rev. Job Shenton, pastor of Fairville Methodist church, dropped dead to-day of heart failure, as he sat at the dinner table with his wife.

Brakeman Killed. Drummondville, Que., Dec. 11.—Raoul Houde, an I. C. P. brakeman, was killed while coupling cars here last night.

Soldier's Wedding. Kingston, Ont., Dec. 11.—Capt. W. B. Carruthers, who has accepted a commission in the Third Contingent, was married this afternoon to Miss Ella Macpherson. They will spend the honeymoon in Halifax.

DISCUSSING THE TREATY. Washington, D. C., Dec. 11.—Two speeches on the Hay-Panchoffo treaty were made in the executive session of the United States senate to-day, one by Senator Bacon in opposition to the treaty, and the other by Senator Cullom, the prospective chairman of the committee on foreign relations, in support of it. Mr. Bacon replied to the speech made yesterday by Senator Lodge. He summed up his objections in the statement that he could not freely accept any treaty which does not place the Isthmian canal entirely under United States auspices and United States control. The "only reply," he said, "that the advocates of the treaty make to criticism is that the canal would be under the full control of the United States in time of war; but this is no more true now than under the old treaty."

Senator Cullom contended that the new treaty practically changes the conditions presented by the first Hay-Panchoffo treaty, clearly relieving it of the necessity of an amendment as that made to the old treaty upon the suggestion of Senator Davis, because the treaty itself will permit the United States under international law, to own, manage and defend the canal in any way that it may choose.

"In other words," he added, "in a war with Great Britain or with any other power the treaty would be suspended under the law which governs nations until the war should be concluded, when it would be revived and again enforced."

He admitted that the new treaty retains the general principle of neutrality as did the original Hay-Panchoffo treaty, but he urged that it does not re-nact, or keep alive, any of the provisions of the treaty of 1850.

"ONE FOOT IN THE GRAVE."—If the thousands of people who rush to so tragically as South American Nevada as a last resort would get it as a first resort, how much misery and suffering would be spared. If you have any nerve disorder you needn't suffer a minute longer. A thousand testimonials to prove it. Sold by Jackson & Co. and Hall & Co.—37.

Perth, Ont., Dec. 12.—John Alexander McLaren, a well known journalist of Perth, died yesterday afternoon, aged seventy years.

MATTEWAN OVERDUE.

She Has Not Yet Reached San Francisco—Although On Nine Days From Nainaimo.

A special dispatch from Nainaimo to the Times says: "No news has been received here of the steamer Mattewan, Capt. Crosscup, which left here on the evening of the 2nd inst., and which should have reached San Francisco before now. She usually carried from Nainaimo to San Francisco, but on the occasion mentioned made a special trip here for coal. The steamer took out 4,850 tons."

A special dispatch from San Francisco to the Times says that the ship Lucille, from Oyster Harbor for Kibe, has been sighted off the Golden Gate, dismasted. Wreckage Found.

Seattle, Dec. 12.—A special to the Times from Port Townsend says: "The mail steamer Gertrude, from Neah Bay this morning, brings news which seemingly accounts for the fate of the schooner Mattewan, now six days overdue at San Francisco. On Saturday near Olette, on the coast, the natives found a complete medicine chest and several water canisters, also a board and every piece bears the name of 'Mattewan,' plainly painted.

ADDITIONAL TROOPS WANTED IN AFRICA

VIEWS OF RETURNED COLONIALS ON WAR

They Assert Too Much Consideration is Shown to Burglars in the Refugee Camps.

New York, Dec. 12.—A dispatch to the Times from Wellington, N. Z., says: "The returned New Zealanders, returning from South Africa declare that more soldiers are wanted to finish the war. The troops have the utmost confidence in Lord Kitchener, but his efforts are hampered by the advised agitation in the United Kingdom."

It is asserted that excessive consideration is shown to the Boers in the refugee camps, while the colonists of Natal are suffering hardships. Krause Remanded.

London, Dec. 12.—In the Bow street police court to-day the prosecution against Dr. Krause, ex-governor of Johannesburg, on charges of high treason and inciting to murder, having concluded its case, counsel for prisoner announced that he reserved his defence.

PASSAGE AT ARMS.

The Premier and E. V. Bodwell Have a Tilt in the Supreme Court.

There was quite a ripple of amusement in the Supreme court caused by some spirited passages between the Premier and E. V. Bodwell, K. C. Mr. Dunsmuir had been summoned as a witness for the defendant in the action brought by D. R. Harris against Mrs. J. O. Dunsmuir, which has been occupying the attention of the Court for several days. Mr. Bodwell raised some objection to a question put to the witness by Sir Charles Dwyer, on the ground that it was "leading," when the Premier surprised all present by remarking in his well known emphatic manner: "I'd like you to understand, sir, that I refuse to be led by anybody. You can lead me; nor can anybody else. I'm here to give evidence, and I'll give it. Understand that."

Later on, when Mr. Bodwell had asked the witness a few questions in cross-examination, and was taking his seat, Mr. Dunsmuir caused a further sensation by volunteering the statement, "There's something else I'd like to say, Mr. Bodwell."

"Oh, I'm not asking you anything further," replied Mr. Bodwell.

"But there's something I want to say, all the same," the witness proceeded. "The 'only reply,' he said, 'that the advocates of the treaty make to criticism is that the canal would be under the full control of the United States in time of war; but this is no more true now than under the old treaty.'"

In conclusion Mr. Bacon announced that while he had no intention of voting for the treaty, he would do nothing to obstruct its ratification.

Senator Cullom contended that the new treaty practically changes the conditions presented by the first Hay-Panchoffo treaty, clearly relieving it of the necessity of an amendment as that made to the old treaty upon the suggestion of Senator Davis, because the treaty itself will permit the United States under international law, to own, manage and defend the canal in any way that it may choose.

He admitted that the new treaty retains the general principle of neutrality as did the original Hay-Panchoffo treaty, but he urged that it does not re-nact, or keep alive, any of the provisions of the treaty of 1850.

GIFFORD'S RETURN DECLARED VALID

CONFIRMED IN SEAT FOR NEW WESTMINSTER

Text of Mr. Justice Martin's Judgment, in Which He Upholds Preliminary Objections to Petition.

Yesterday afternoon Mr. Justice Martin delivered judgment in the Gifford election case, confirming the member for New Westminster in his seat and dismissing the petition against his election. The text of the judgment was as follows: "The question now to be determined is: Was the petition presented within 21 days after the return was made, as required by S. 8. (2) of Sec. 214 of the Provincial Elections Act? It will be noted that the language is 'after the return was made, and it is contended on the one hand that the petitioner had the whole of the day on which the return was made and 21 days thereafter within which to make his presentation, while on the other hand it is urged that under the circumstances, and according to the best meaning of the act, fractions of the day must be considered, and that the time against the petitioner immediately after the return was in fact made. From the evidence I find that the return was made to the deputy provincial secretary on Saturday, September 29, at 2.30 p.m., and the petition was presented to the registrar of this court about noon on Saturday, October 12th. Sec. 27 S. 8. (3) of the Provincial Elections Act (1895) 2 Q. B. 294, wherein the rule is laid down by Lord Esher as follows: 'No general rule exists for the computation of time either under the Bankruptcy Act or any other statute, or, indeed under any statute, in a contract, and the natural mode of computation is to have regard in each case to the purpose for which the computation is to be made. . . . If they (the older decisions) are taken as a guide, the general rule as to the mode of computation is that rule has been departed from in recent times, and no longer exists.' And Lord Justice A. L. Smith (1893) 2 Q. 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