

of which the "merit" belonged to George Townshend. Could confession of ignorance be more absolute? Wolfe's answer was to the effect that the attack would be at the Foulon about two miles from Quebec. But he reminded the Brigadiers that it was not usual in public orders to indicate the direct spot of an attack "nor for any inferior officers not charged with a particular duty to ask instructions on that point." To the best of his knowledge and abilities he had fixed upon that spot where they could act with the most force and were most likely to succeed. "If I am mistaken I am sorry for it and must be answerable to his Majesty and the public for the consequence." Mr. Doughty says that "Wolfe's sudden rejection of the plan of the Brigadiers after all the details had been arranged naturally caused a feeling of resentment at the moment and protests were made. This may be the reason why Wolfe did not disclose his plan more fully to his officers at the time."¹ It is a remarkable fact that what Wolfe kept from his Brigadiers he communicated to Colonel Burton commanding Webb's Regiment at Point Levi on the 10th September—

"Sixteen hundred of our men are upon the south shore to clean and refresh themselves and their transports; and indeed to save the whole army which must have perished if they had continued forty-eight hours longer on board. To-morrow the troops re-embark, the fleet sails up the river a little higher, as if intending to land above upon the north shore, keeping a convenient distance for the boats and armed vessels to fall down to the Foulon; and we count (if no accident of weather or other prevents) to make a powerful effort at that spot about four in the morning of the 13th. At ten or eleven or twelve at night, sooner or later as it may be necessary, on Wednesday the 12th, we get into our boats. If we are forced to alter these measures you shall know it;

¹ *The Siege of Quebec*, vol. II, p. 248.