nal omits to do. The science of logic is not a mere empty phantasm of the brain, but a methodical arrangement of the way in which the mind thinks; not-to explain it by analogy—a "Siren" which, by the turning of a handle, is made to imitate certain sounds, but the science of akoustics, which explains what sound is and how produced. To say that logic does not exhibit the whole process by which a conclusion is reached is searcely correct; "the laws of thought themselves are few in number, and lie, in examples of perpetual occurrence, under every thinking man's observation."(24) That the majority of mankind draw conclusions by processes which they are unable to put down in black and white, does not vitiate the theory. M. Jourdain was astonished to learn that he talked prose. If, however, it is His Eminence's opinion that logic is wanting in this direction—that it fails to cover the range usually attributed to it, he might have treated us to an excursus to that effect. At the very least, he ought explicitly to have shown why it is that in simple trains of thought, common logic is amply sufficient, while, in complex ones, it entirely breaks down. That it is "cumbrous" does not prove it invalid But to say that it is in concrete cases that the office of the illative sense lies; in long and complex discussions; when the ordinary method of reasoning would be cumbrous; when there are many converging probabilities, are suspicious phrases. When an artery is lost to sight in its capillaries, the dissector does not immediately promulgate a new theory of the circulatory system. And surely the most abstract

<sup>24.</sup> An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought Abp. Thomson, Intro , § 4.