

Supply—Northern Affairs

submarine the *Nautilus*, was something in the neighbourhood of \$60 million, so there is a great deal of progress to be made in the economic construction of these craft before they can be used for the purpose I have mentioned. But this certainly opens up new vistas of development.

This emphasizes in my own mind what I have often thought was an important point in northern development, that defence and civilian development must go together in that part of the world. I know that has been the objective of government policy for a good many years, and these recent developments just emphasize its importance. For that purpose, of course, it becomes even more important than it was previously to establish beyond any doubt our claim to our Arctic territory. This is more important than ever before in view of Soviet interest in that part of the world, in view of the utilization by Soviet parties of moving ice fields for scientific purposes and that kind of thing, ice fields which I believe are included in what we call the Canadian sector, and in view of the development with our approval and co-operation of United States defence activity in that part of the world; indeed, development to the point where I have read articles in United States magazines and newspapers on Arctic development in Canadian territory in which reference is made by the United States authors to "our" Arctic. Therefore it becomes more important than ever before that there be no doubt left in the mind of anybody that it is the Canadian Arctic.

We recall that the first claim to Arctic island territory was advanced on behalf of the Canadian government as far back as 1907, when Senator Poirier put forward the sector theory which was elaborated in the House of Commons many years later, in 1925, by the minister of the interior of that day, Hon. Charles Stewart. Under that sector theory Canada lays claim to all the land between the extension of the 60th and the 141st meridians of longitude until they meet at the north pole. In 1953 Mr. St. Laurent, who was very much alive to the importance of this problem, especially in the light of recent development, made a significant statement in the House of Commons and the previous government did something to implement that statement. Mr. St. Laurent said then:

We must leave no doubt of our active occupation and exercise of our sovereignty in these northern lands right up to the pole.

Of course there arises at once a question of the rights of control, or sovereignty, if you like, over the permanent ice fields. Perhaps the extension of the continental shelf about which the minister spoke in this house in another debate will extend our rights over

[Mr. Pearson.]

these permanent ice fields for some miles under that doctrine of sovereignty over the continental shelf which I suggest, however, is not yet quite formally established. But beyond that there is certainly no recognition by any other country that I know of, by the United States, the United Kingdom or the U.S.S.R., that we have any rights of sovereignty or control over the permanent ice.

Perhaps the time is coming, Mr. Chairman, if it has not already come, when we should try to work out an international agreement to see exactly where we stand in regard to our control and sovereign rights under this sector theory, and try to get those rights established by international agreement. I suggest to the minister that we shall have considerable difficulty in doing that if we base our claim merely on the sector theory which has not yet, I think, been generally considered a valid doctrine in international law.

The sector theory itself is not enough; it must be followed by rights based on discovery and effective occupation. That had been very much in the mind of the previous government, as no doubt it is in the mind of the present government, to buttress any claims we have under one theory of international law by rights of discovery and effective occupation, which are acknowledged by all as valid in international law. That surely means that policy must be directed toward the extension of Canadian civilian occupancy and control of all Arctic activities. I know the difficulty in this regard, but I also know a great many things have been done in the field of defence particularly, in fact almost exclusively in the field of defence by the United States, that we in Canada would not have done and perhaps would have found it impossible to do because of their expense.

I know there are a great many facilities in the Arctic which have been built by the United States, some of which are occupied by United States personnel, and some of which are occupied jointly by the United States and Canada; but surely even if we have not been able to construct things like the D.E.W. line because of the magnitude of the operation and because, in some instances, we were not convinced of the essential wisdom of doing that kind of thing at that time even for defence; whatever the reason may have been, our objective surely must be that when the United States, with our agreement always and with our rights always reserved, has constructed those facilities, to take them over, in so far as they continue to be useful, at the earliest possible moment and put them under Canadian control and, when it can be done, under civilian control.