

St. Lawrence river is established by ample authority already cited in evidence, and is practically conceded by the applicants. The figures submitted at the present hearing on behalf of the Canadian Government (computed with reference to periods of depression) show that, if anything, the loss has heretofore been underestimated. They indicate a lowering of the water at various points as follows:

For a withdrawal at Chicago of 10,000 cubic feet per second:

	Inches.
Lake Michigan.. . . .	7.4
Lower sill of lock at Sault Ste. Marie.. . . .	7.0
Lake Huron.. . . .	7.4
Lake Erie.. . . .	6.1
Lake Ontario.. . . .	4.5
Rapide Plat in St. Lawrence river.. . . .	6.8
Cornwall canal, lock 21.. . . .	5.0
Coteau.. . . .	5.4
Montreal .. . . .	10.2

Under those conditions I think it is very important that this country should see that the level of the Great Lakes is maintained in order to ensure safe navigation.

Another phase of this question, and one which was very fully gone into by the hon. member for Nicolet (Mr. Lamarche), is its military aspect, and the fact that the route is entirely within Canadian territory should not be lost sight of. Canada and the United States have for a period of 100 years enjoyed peace, and I am sure it is the wish of every Canadian that we should have century after century of peace, between these two great neighbouring nations. It may be interesting to cite some strategic advantages which are possessed by the Georgian Bay Canal route. The conclusions to be drawn from the war of 1812 are that land victories or defeats were not vital, but, their effects were dependent upon the control of the lakes. This control was possessed alternately by the British and Americans, and always the success of the campaign was with the power controlling the lakes. A book issued by Major General G. W. Robinson, entitled 'Canada and Canadian Defence', contains the following:

Lake Ontario is, comparatively speaking a more important lake with regard to the defence of Canada than lake Erie; and fortunately the Canadian shore of lake Ontario afforded facilities for a good naval port—Kingston. The success of an enemy upon lake Erie, cannot, so long as lake Ontario and the country to the north of it, including the eastern shore of lake Huron, are in British hands, reduce Canada or cut off the country east of Toronto from Montreal and the sea.

President Madison of the United States wrote in 1812:

The command of the lakes by a superior force on the water ought to have been a fundamental principle of the national policy, the moment the peace of 1813 took place.

[Mr. G. V. White.]

mental part of the national policy, the moment the peace of 1813 took place.

The Duke of Wellington, writing to Sir George Murray on December 24, 1814, expressed himself thus:

I have told ministers repeatedly that a naval superiority on the lakes is a sine qua non of success in the war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object should be only defensive, and I hope when you are there they will take care to secure it for you.

In order to follow up this advice, Great Britain constructed the Rideau canal between 1812 and 1832, at a cost of several million dollars, in order to avoid international waters and to provide navigation between Montreal and lake Ontario. That these conditions apply to the present time, and must be seriously considered, it is only necessary to point out that the United States has, with the consent of the Canadian Government, overlooked the Rush-Bagot treaty of 1817 by which the naval forces on the lakes to be maintained by the United States and by Great Britain respectively, were not to exceed: On lake Ontario, one vessel; on the upper lakes, two vessels, and on lake Champlain one vessel, none of which were to exceed 100 tons burden, and the armament not to be heavier than one 18-pound cannon; the convention to be terminable after six months, upon notice by either side. The convention has practically been terminated by the United States, with the consent of Great Britain and Canada, and the United States now has several training ships on the Great Lakes, any one of which is as a dreadnought to a fishing sloop, as compared with anything which Canada has afloat on the lakes at the present time. Then, the United States has on the upper lakes several hundred large steel freighters, of about 8,000 tons each, as compared with a dozen or two that belong to Canada. Most of these big freighters could be immediately equipped with light guns from the United States arsenals, and under present conditions they could hold these lakes and invade the Canadian shores with impunity. They could not get into lake Ontario until the Welland canal is enlarged, when they would also control that lake, which under present conditions, is capable of being controlled in the same way by Canada, owing to the majority of ships on that water being Canadian. The lesson of the war of 1812-14 is that loss of control of lake Ontario by Canada would probably compel the withdrawal of all troops operating to the west