

In any event, somewhat vague declarations and approval of reports of the Secretary-General took the place of clear and detailed resolutions. It was on these (on the whole constructive and useful generalizations) and especially on certain assumptions and hopes and expectations, received as a result of separate discussions with the United States, and which it is the particular responsibility of that country to make effective, that Israel withdrew her troops from Egypt and the Gaza strip.

I have heard it said that we pressed Israel to adopt this procedure and to rely on these assumptions as sufficient safeguards for her position after withdrawal. There is not one word of truth in this, even though we thought the assumptions reasonable. On the contrary, as I have said, we did our best, but without success, to convert such assumptions into United Nations recommendations covering United Nations administration of Gaza, deployment of UNEF on the armistice demarcation line, non-interference with shipping through the Straits of Tiran, non-discrimination in the use of the Suez Canal, and full compliance with all terms of the Armistice Agreement, including prohibition of all hostile acts. I am only sorry that we did not succeed in our efforts to get such a resolution through. Our failure, however, will not prevent us doing the best we can in the United Nations and as a contributor to UNEF, to pacify the area, and prepare the way for the peace settlement that must come.

Looking at the basic realities of the present situation, the following points seem to me to be important: (a) Israel is entitled to the security which she has not yet enjoyed; (b) the Arabs, who originally insisted that Palestine should be a unitary state, have for the past five years made it clear that they will now accept the principle of partition on two or three conditions. These conditions are far from being acceptable to Israel, though they do represent a step forward in that they do recognize that a State of Israel has come to stay. Perhaps that step can be consolidated and others taken if and when immediate tensions are reduced and if an atmosphere can be created more favourable to negotiation and to an ultimate peaceful settlement. I think that an important factor which might be used to this end is the stronger interest which the United Nations (apart from the U.S.S.R. and its satellites) has been taking in genuine peace for the Middle East. This is certainly a continuing asset which has not been exploited to the full extent of its capabilities for helpfulness.

One final matter I would mention, and one to which you have given much attention already, is the extent to which Israel's insecurity is increased by the continuing problem of the Arab refugees. I do not wish to say much about this matter this evening since it is a problem with many ramifications, but there remains the fact that Israel, which has always acknowledged the obligation in principle to compensate the refugees for their