

"Those who are accessories to these crimes and violations - the merchants of conflict - who illi-citly traffic in the means of war, must likewise not be left unaccountable. Conflict areas are often awash with arms, especially military small arms and light weapons. When these fall into the wrong hands, their misuse compounds the misery of civilians, who are overwhelmingly their victims," said Minister Axworthy in his Feb. 12, 1999 speech to the Security Council.

***Recommendation: The Security Council should consider the effectiveness, conditions and impact of economic sanctions, such as those applied to Iraq.***

The humanitarian impact of sanctions was addressed through a Canadian-sponsored initiative: three panels devoted to specifically discuss the case of Iraq. The findings of the panels became the basis of a January 2000 Security Council resolution that broke the deadlock between the United States and the United Nations on sanctions against Iraq. The resolution allows for renewed weapons inspections and increases the amount of oil Iraq can sell for food.

Canada also sponsored the International Peace Academy to conduct a comprehensive report covering the last ten years of Security Council sanctions. The report will make recommendations for improving the current practice of Security Council sanctions, by focussing on the issues of effective implementation and humanitarian impact.

### **Kosovo and UN Security Council legitimacy**

Despite these successes, the Security Council continued to face severe challenges to its authority and legitimacy, especially when its five permanent, veto-holding members face an impasse. The crisis in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo prompted such an impasse.

The United States, United Kingdom and France supported using NATO armed forces to prevent what they believed would be an "ethnic cleansing" campaign against the Kosovar Albanians. China and Russia opposed armed intervention and NATO's involvement. When Serbia refused to sign the Rambouillet Accord, which would have restored autonomy to Kosovo as a province within the Yugoslav federation, NATO countries believed peace through diplomatic channels had failed.

***"The idea is to get the Security Council to build protection of civilians into the mandates of peace missions - perhaps thus avoiding the kind of slaughter that took place in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, where thousands were massacred as UN troops looked on."***

***-- Jeff Sallot and Paul Knox, The Globe and Mail, January 1, 1999***

"Ministers of the Contact Group deplore the failure of the parties to make progress towards a political settlement, and cannot accept that this should permit the crisis to continue," announced the NATO Contact Group of Foreign Ministers in January 1999. Shortly afterward, the Yugoslav army intensified its counterinsurgency campaign against Kosovar separatist rebels.

Fearing a Chinese or Russian veto in the Security Council, NATO decided to intervene militarily in response to Yugoslavia's counterinsurgency campaign in Kosovo. It did so with the financial and moral support of the G-8 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The war began and so did the controversy over its legitimacy. The Secretary-General immediately called for an end to the war, but NATO was committed. In April, the Non-Aligned Movement of the UN