(4)   **Monitoring Measures** (measures requiring or encouraging the opportunity to monitor constrained or limited military forces, facilities, structures, and activities, principally through the use of monitoring devices)

Examples include: perimeter monitors; motion sensors for no-go areas; sensors for use in restricted access areas; activity sensors;

(5)   **Facilitation of Verification Measures;** (measures requiring or encouraging participants to facilitate and not interfere with agreed verification efforts)

Examples include: agreement not to interfere with inspections or monitoring efforts

TYPE C: CONSTRAINT CBMs

(1)   **Activity Constraint Measures** (measures requiring or encouraging participants to avoid or limit provocative military activities)

Examples include: no harassing activities such as "playing chicken" on the high seas or near territorial boundaries;

(2)   **Deployment Constraint Measures** (measures requiring or encouraging participants to avoid or limit the provocative stationing or positioning of military forces)

Examples include: no threatening manoeuvres or equipment tests, no threatening deployments near sensitive areas (such as tanks on a border), equipment constraints such as no attack aircraft within range of a neighbour's rear

area territory, manpower limits, nuclear free zones;

(3)   **Technology Constraint Measures** (measures requiring or encouraging participants to avoid or limit the development and/or deployment of specified military technologies, including systems and subsystems, believed by participating states to have a destabilizing character or impact)

Examples include: no *replacement* of deployed military equipment of certain types (typically, tanks, heavily armoured combat vehicles, self-propelled artillery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters) with new, more advanced types; no *modernization* of deployed military equipment of certain types in certain key, well-defined respects; no *training* with new systems; no *field testing* of new designs; and *no production* of specified new systems or subsystems.

Conclusion

To summarize briefly, confidence building, according to the transformation view is *not* simply the adoption of specific measures providing participating states with more reliable information about each others' military capabilities and activities. Nor is it simply the process of acquiring that information once an agreement is in place. Nor, finally, is it simply *any* activity that can produce some generalized feeling of well-being or reduced concern.

Contrary to more modest conceptions of the phenomenon, the transformation view argues that confidence building is a potentially powerful security management approach that, when conditions are supportive, can facilitate, focus, and amplify the potential for a positive transformation in the security relations of participating states, changing the basic character of at least some security