

enunciated in an ad-hoc way. There is perhaps a usefulness in setting it out formally. However, there is no longer a doctrinal gap which would impact negatively on UN peace-keeping generally or rapid reaction capacity specifically. This is not a comment on the correctness or impact of that ad-hoc doctrine.

Moving partly from the political to the strategic, problems do appear to be proliferating in the formulation of peace-keeping mission mandates. At present, political and overarching management guidelines (e.g., troops strengths) or mandates are presently formulated by the Security Council on a case-by-case basis.

The first issue which is particularly relevant to rapid reaction, is the speed at which a mandate is cobbled together once there is the political will to deal with an issue. While politics are such that there will always be a degree of ad-hoc crisis management, there appears to be a need for various model mission mandate frameworks. This would allow the Security Council to "fill in the blanks" when passing a resolution as opposed to allowing time constraints and political pressures to overly influence what is forgotten or purposefully left out. These mission "templates" are being created by DPKO.

The second issue is the absence of specialised advisors, particularly military, in order to enable the SC to more effectively devise achievable and effective mandates. There needs to be earlier involvement in mission mandate formulation by key parts of the UN Secretariat. DPKO is the lead peace-keeping department. Other key departments are the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, DPA, DHA, DAM (Dept. of Administration and Management), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), and the Department of Public Affairs.

The SG's Task Force on UN Operations is chaired by the USG/DPA and attended by the heads of DPKO, DPA, DHA, OLA, and a Special Advisor from the SG's Office. The Task force is especially geared to deal with policy issues that pertain to complex emergencies. Logically this task force could bring together relevant parts of the UN to provide coherent advice to the Security Council in the formulation of a mission mandate.

This "military-civilian-political interface" was discussed from a slightly different perspective in the previous Chapter 5 Political Decision Making. The creation of some international peace and security committee outside of the Secretariat might be a useful counterpart to a Secretariat body advising the Security Council on mission mandates.