

than one occasion.⁴⁰ Khrushchev also claimed to have had a hand in President Kennedy's election in 1960.⁴¹ Brezhnev claimed for the Soviet Union a role in promoting a degree of realism in American foreign policy that helped Nixon's reelection in 1972.⁴² And Soviet concessions to West Germany, even the release of Volga Germans, seem to have been intended to support Brandt and the reformist trends in the election of November 1972. These and other instances of Soviet activity in support of collaborative and "realistic" tendencies in Western foreign policy indicate that the Genoa precedent is not only relevant to current Soviet needs and a device to justify policies of détente and agreement, but also a system of perceptions and practices that is to some extent reflected in the outward behaviour of the regime.

I say to some extent, not simply because Soviet policy is never unilinear or guided by one tendency only, but also because neo-Stalinists have sought to appropriate Genoa for their own purposes. From the perspective of reform policy, cooperation with the United States on European matters is essential. A limitation of détente and agreements to America's allies would serve to reduce East-West tensions and instabilities only partially, thereby denying the diversion of substantial political and economic resources to tasks of internal development in the USSR. Hence the necessity not merely to include the United States in all-European negotiations, but