

5. These factors indicate that the framework for on-site inspection in CD/881 should be strengthened. Any solution needs to provide adequate reassurance and deterrence with respect to the huge number of facilities in question. It needs to do so in a way which does not prejudice those elements of the inspection framework already existing in CD/881. And it needs to be cost-effective. The question is how this can best be done.

ELEMENTS FOR A SOLUTION

6. A number of possible solutions have been suggested, which have made valuable contributions to thinking on this subject. One approach, proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany in CD/CW/WP.183 and 210, is for a verification procedure based on ad hoc checks. The United Kingdom delegation would like to suggest an alternative option which owes much to the Federal Republic of Germany's ideas. It also draws on experience in operating the inspection system established under the Stockholm Document which can be summarized as follows.

7. The Stockholm Document, produced by the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in 1986, outlines a number of politically binding confidence and security building measures for the 35 participating States. In connection with the notification of certain military activities the Document specifies that each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State. Such inspections shall not exceed three in any one calendar year in any one State, and no State should be obliged to accept more than one inspection in any one calendar year from any single State. Within these quotas the inspections are mandatory. The inspection request has come to be recognized as non-confrontational and the system has proved to be effective in establishing confidence that Stockholm Document obligations are being observed. Suitably amended, this type of inspection could have value in the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

PROPOSAL

8. Building on previous proposals by the Federal Republic of Germany and others and on the provisions of the Stockholm Document, the United Kingdom delegation suggests that the current verification framework might be complemented by provision for an additional on-site inspection system on the following lines:

- Each State Party would have the right to initiate inspections by the Technical Secretariat in civil and military facilities and elsewhere on the territory of any other State Party.