ular ruler, but at the wholesale massacre of an unoffending crowd of holiday sight-seers, men, women and children, merely because they are English, are satisfactory proofs of the success with which the missionaries of malignity have done their work. The same spirit was shown in the attempts upon London Bridge, the Nelson monument and the Underground Railway. A perusal of a file of the newspapers which alone find their way into the house of the Irish peasant is enough to explain and almost excuse atrocities which outvie those of any ordinary savage. Fed as the people are with vitriolic falsehood, how can it be expected that their temper or their deeds should be other than they are? The tidings of a dynamite butchery at Westminster or in the Tower would have been received with the same exultation which, under a hollow show of grief, hailed the assassination of Lord Frederick Cavendish even among the Irish in England who were drawing English wages and receiving English charity. The hand of the public assassin is for the most part fortunately irresolute, and in providing for his own escape he generally fails to secure the destruction of his victim. This has been the case in the late outrages. British statesmen have received a lesson which, if they can profit by it, will have been cheaply purchased with such damage as has been done. They have been warned in time what an Irish Republic would be, and what would be its relations to Great Britain and its influence as a neighbour on her strength and prosperity, if they allowed it to be carved out of her side. They have also been taught what would be the fate of all men of English blood, and of all who have been loyal to the Union in Ireland, if they were left to the mercies of a Fenian Parliament and its constituents. The Parliament of the United Kingdom has the power, if it will for a moment lay faction aside, to put an end to this revolt, and make the Irishry once for all understand that, if they have any grievances calling for redress, redress shall be freely given; but that rebellion can only have one end.

NOTHING has been heard, up to the time of our going to press, of General Stewart, and the anxiety in England is evidently extreme. But before we give way to alarm we must recollect that there are a good many croakers. The Senior United Service Club always croaks. It is the habit and the privilege of age. Lord Wolseley has a good many enemies; so has the Government; all these are sure to criticize even if they are not really despondent. Lord Wolseley has not yet established, for he has never had the opportunity of establishing, his reputation as a great general; but in the expeditions hitherto entrusted to him, and which have happened to be much of the same character as the present, he has at least so acquitted himself that we may give him credit on the present occasion for knowing what he is about. The savages fought in the last as they did in former actions with a valour which is the attribute of their race, and which in their case is exalted by fanaticism. But the first onset of a barbarian, like that of a wild beast, is usually the fiercest, and inexperience of danger is often a part of his courage. In the absence of extraordinary accidents discipline has never failed to assert its ascendancy in war. The influence of the Mehdi is that of an impostor; it is a bubble which defeat will at once burst; and he can hardly have any permanent resources, either in the way of commissariat or in that of arms and ammunition. If Gordon has been able to hold out, Stewart may be able to make way. The hopeful view, then, is reasonable. In the meantime the interest excited, though painful, is not unwholesome, since it turns the minds of Englishmen for a time from their factions to their country.

FROM representations which have reached us it appears that some of our subscribers overlooked the notice appended to the paper by "A Bystander" in our last number. We therefore repeat the assurance that the writer of those papers is still, and purposes to remain, a regular contributor to THE WEEK. Whatever he writes for the Canadian Press will appear in these columns.

SOME people have such a pleasant way of putting things. "Now, do let me propose you as a member." "But suppose they blackball me?" "Pooh! Absurd! Why, my dear fellow, there's not a man in the club that knows you even!"

SHERIDAN, when charged with inconsistency, retorted that the accusation reminded him of the reasoning of an entertainer of a convivial party, who, hearing his friends observe that it was time to take leave, as the watchman was crying "Past three," said, "Why, you don't mind that fellow, do you? He's the most inconsistent fellow out. Why, he changes his story every half-hour."

THE LIQUOR LICENSE QUESTION.

WHEN the Canada Temperance Act (better known as the Scott Act) was declared by the Privy Council to be constitutional, it was generally supposed that the question of jurisdiction raised between the Parliament of Canada and the Provincial Legislatures was set at rest. Hodge's case, in which the Ontario Liquor License Act was declared valid, opened up the question again; and following that decision comes the opinion of the Supreme Court that the Dominion Liquor License Act is invalid. The judges of the Supreme Court did not give their reasons, but it appears to be an open secret that they considered it their duty to follow the decision of the Privy Council in Hodge's case, as being the latest expression of judicial opinion upon the license question. The matter, therefore, lies between Russell's case and Hodge's case. In the former, the Canada Temperance Act was held to be constitutional; in the latter, the Ontario Liquor License Act was declared to be valid.

The judgment in Russell's case contains what appear to be unequivocal expressions of denial, in so far as the plenary jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislature to regulate the liquor traffic was asserted. Indeed, in answer to the argument that the power of the Provinces to pass laws respecting "Shop, saloon, tavern, auctioneer, and other licenses, in order to the raising of a revenue" prevented the Parliament of Canada from legislating upon the liquor traffic, their Lordships said: "It is to be observed that the power of granting licenses is not assigned to the Provincial Legislatures for the purpose of regulating trade, but in order to the raising of a revenue for provincial, local, or municipal purposes." And again, they say, "If the argument of the appellant that the power given to the Provincial Legislatures to raise a revenue by licenses prevents the Dominion from legislating with regard to any article or commodity which was or might be covered by such licenses were to prevail, the consequence would be that laws which might be necessary for the public good or the public safety could not be enacted at all." And so their Lordships thought that the promotion of temperance by means of a uniform law throughout the Dominion related to the "peace, order and good government of Canada," and was within the legislative competence of the Parliament of Canada. And the mere fact that the Provinces had power to raise a revenue from the liquor trade did not oust the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.

Then came Hodge's case, in which the Ontario Liquor License Act was held to be valid. This act is, as its name implies, a license law; that is, it licenses, permits, or makes lawful the sale of intoxicating liquor under certain restrictions. And by one section of the act the sale of liquor is totally prohibited during the period between seven o'clock on Saturday evening and six o'clock on the following Monday morning. Their Lordships declared that such an enactment was in the nature of a local police regulation, and "calculated to preserve, in the municipality, peace and public decency, and repress drunkenness, and disorderly and riotous conduct." This is coming dangerously near declaring it to be a measure relating to the "peace, order and good government" of the locality, which the Canada Temperance Act was designed for. And so their Lordships felt; and they took occasion to say that they affirmed Russell's case, and thought it reconcileable with the Hodge case. Place the two conclusions in juxtaposition. The Dominion has power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor, because such a measure is for the *peace, order and good government* of Canada; while the *preservation of peace and public decency, and the repression of drunkenness and disorderly and riotous conduct* are matters of local police regulation, and may be effected by Provincial regulation of the liquor traffic. Casuists may see the distinction between the two italicized phrases, and august judicial tribunals may assert that they form separate subjects of legislation, and ought to be controlled by distinct legislative bodies; but ordinary intelligence will not appreciate the distinction. A comparison of the two enactments, the Canada Temperance Act and the Ontario Liquor License Act, based upon the decisions in Russell and Hodge's cases, will show that neither the enactments nor the cases are logically consistent.

The Ontario Act prohibits altogether the sale of intoxicating liquor on Saturday night and Sunday. The Legislature must therefore have power to prohibit its sale on the whole of Saturday and Sunday; and, if on these two days, then on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. And if it can prohibit the sale on three days of the week, it must be able to prohibit it during the whole week, or altogether. Or, it might prohibit the sale for all except certain specified purposes. And if these purposes were sacramental and medicinal purposes, the enactment would be identical with the Canada Temperance Act, which has already been declared to be within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada. Thus we see that, without altering in any degree the principle upon which the Ontario Act proceeds, but by