

sequence the natural occurs—the scope of the original movement itself is limited. The demand to-day is the same as that of yesterday, which having received its satisfaction, dies down without creating a *new* demand, or a variation in the process by which it itself took place. Such an account of the mental life and experience would be totally onesided and inaccurate.* It is true that scarcely enough can be made of the habit side; that unless reliance could be placed in the power of the organism to retain any adapted movement which is acquired, the demands upon conscious direction and attention would be so overwhelming that the vital force would be totally expended without securing the simplest purposive movement, while the mind would be one chaos of persisting and clamorous demands. One however, soon sees that it is sometimes more essential to break up a habit than to retain it intact. There comes a tension between the old way of doing a thing and the end—between the old habit and the image of the impulse functioning in a *new way*; hence there is a call for a reconstruction of the tendency. This is done under the guidance of the end; but the end itself is not fixed in the manner we have been considering, it is flexible, chargeable, growing, and it must too be traced back to original unmediated impulses. It is an outcome of reactions. It is plain that considering the reaction of an impulse, it may be viewed in two ways, according as its reflection or return upon the original impulse is total or partial. If the reaction is entire, then the expression or the impulse is lost in the original tendency, so that a second time the impulse projects itself; not only is it the self-same impulse, but it contributes the self-same result—endless repetition.

If the reaction is partial, the outcome is totally different; the values received from expression do not fit in of themselves, there takes place a division in experience, on the one hand is seen the experienced result, on the other there is present its felt inadequacy. Out of this latter grows the end, which though it as an end is growing from experience to experience, yet its function must not be lost sight of in the acquiring of specifically new experiences. It performs that task of almost incalculable importance, namely of breaking up the old habit to meet the new demands of the individual. There is thus a place for thought to enter, and a function for it to perform. The expressions of an impulse may be so very complex and numerous, that deliberation grows apace in the fitting of them into the primal tendency. The variable and fluctuating calls ever for the exercise of the best thought at command, *probable becomes in fact the very guide of life*: Experience grows thus more expanded and complex as it grows relatively more unified,—more enriched as it grows more co-ordinated. In short, while it is not forgotten that habits are instrumental in economizing force, in as much as they eliminate the necessity of re-learning definite combinations of movements, yet the retained and the means of retaining would be worse than useless, were it not that the other side of the process comes into operation, and by providing