Act, 1900, s. 1 (see R.S.O. c. 175, s. 4). The action was tried in a county court and the judge left it to the jury to say whether the interest was excessive and whether the transaction was harsh and unconscionable. The Divisional Court (Ridley and Bankes, JJ.) held that he erred in this and that the question whether under the Act, the interest is excessive and the transaction harsh and unreasonable, is for the court and not for the jury, and a new trial was therefore granted.

Criminal Law—Living on earnings of prostitution—Evidence—Charge in respect of one specified day only— The Vagrancy Act, 1898 (61-62 Vict. c. 39), s. 1—(R.S.C. c. 146, s. 2381.)

The King v. Hill (1914) 2 K.B. 386. In this case the indictment charged the defendant with having on one specified day only lived on the wages of prostitution contrary to the Vagrancy Act, 1898 (61-62 Vict. c. 39), s.1—(see R.S.C. c. 146, s. 2381), and on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal (Lord Reading, C.J., and Bankes and Avory, JJ.), the indictment was sustained. It was also contended that under the indictment evidence was not admissible of anything done on any day other than that specified, but this objection was also overruled.

Married woman—Bequest to married woman without power of anticipation—Right of married woman to disclaim bequest—Consideration for disclaimer—Married Woman's Property Act, 1882 (45-46 Vict. c. 75), s. 1—(R.S.O. c. 149, s. 4.)

In rc Wimperis, Wicken, Wilson (1914) 1 Ch. 502. In this case the question was whether a married woman could make a bargain whereby in consideration of a certain payment to her she disclaimed a bequest of personal estate made to her by will subject to a restraint against anticipation. Warrington, J., held that she could validly do so. The bequest in this case was in the shape of an annuity which it was found could not be provided except by a sale of a part of the testatrix's estate which other beneficiaries under the will desired should be retained. The latter then offered to give the married woman a lump sum in consideration of her disclaiming the bequest, which it was held could be validly done. As Warrington, J., puts it, "If the married woman has declined the gift she never had an estate for her separate use and has never been subject to the restraint against anticipation," conse-