

THE JESUITS.

PROF. SCRIMGER ATTACKS AND FATHER JONES DEFENDS THEM.

Montreal Star, Feb. 21.

At a meeting of the Protestant Ministerial Association this morning the Rev. Prof. Scrimger read a paper on the subject of "Errors in the Moral Teaching of the Jesuits." For convenience of presentation the paper was divided into four heads, namely:

1. Those emanating from the erroneous theological doctrines of the Church of Rome such as transubstantiation, baptismal regeneration, orders, confession, penance, indulgences, purgatory, intercession of saints, etc.

2. Those errors arising from extravagant political principles of which they are the chief advocates.

3. Errors which may be said to be inherent in the confessional as a system.

The fourth and most serious class of errors in Jesuit teaching, however, consists of those which arise from the almost constant tendency to laxity in their judgment of actions and intentions when considered in the actual circumstances of life. Under the first head, Mr. Scrimger says, is due to false assumption. Religious duties are multiplied which Scriptural authority does not justify. The second commandment is ignored, although the decalogue forms a large part of their works on Moral Theology. The second head treats of:

SUPREMACY OF THE POPE. Over all other ecclesiastical authorities in the world, and over all temporal sovereigns, the supremacy of the Church over the State, the right of the Church to depose a sovereign, the right of the Church to control education and marriage, the immunity of all ecclesiastical persons from civil jurisdiction, the right of the Church to control the use of the franchise in its own interest. These, too, all involve corresponding duties which they are not slow to urge upon their adherents.

There has been much discussion as to whether they teach that the Pope has a right to depose a sovereign who is disobedient to him, or abrogate his subjects from their allegiance. The earlier Jesuit writers, such as B. Larmaine, undoubtedly did so; the recent ones maintain a somewhat prudent reserve on that point, though asserting principles that would seem to involve it if carried out to their logical conclusion. But altogether apart from that, they teach quite enough to overthrow all free institutions and seriously endanger the public well-being.

3. A third class of errors are those which may be said to be inherent in the confessional as a system. Of the confessional the Pope says:

"Owing to the establishment of this institution as an essential part of its machinery of discipline the Church is under the necessity of training all its priests in the special business of judging the moral quality of acts and states of mind in detail and of advising as to duty under all circumstances. Instead of laying down broad general principles of morality and leaving it to the individual conscience to apply them in detail, the priest is called upon to make the application and to pronounce judgment."

Accordingly as the representative of God by granting or refusing absolution. It is this necessity which has given rise to the whole system of casuistry."

Touching the question of confession we quote the paper in full from the case of adultery which is cited.

Anna, who is guilty of adultery, when questioned by her suspicious husband answered him at first that she had not broken her marriage bond. Then, having received absolution for her sin, she answered: "I am innocent of any such crime." A third time, on being pressed by her husband, she absolutely denied the fault. I have not committed it, she said, meaning such adultery as I am obliged to reveal, or, I have not committed an adultery that must be revealed to you."

Q. Must Anna be condemned?

A. In all three cases Anna may be excused from any lie, because, in the first place, she could say that she had not broken the marriage bond, since it still continued to exist; in the second case she could call herself innocent of adultery, since, after having been to confession and having received absolution, her conscience is at rest, having the moral certainty that her sin was pardoned. She could, according to St. Liguori, even affirm it on oath; in the third case she could also deny her sin, according to a probable opinion, meaning she had not committed it. But a way that she was obliged to reveal it to her husband in the same way as an accused person may say to a judge who interrogates him irregularly: "I have not committed any crime, meaning in such a manner that he is bound to declare it. This is the opinion of St. Liguori and of many others. Similar cases could be cited to almost any extent excluding dissimulation, clandestine baptism, dissimulation of character, secret compensation or stealing, guilty co-operation in the sin of another, forgery. Many of their earlier writers excuse murder under various circumstances, but Gary is not so bold.

We may now consider the methods by which these outrageous conclusions are reached.

It need scarcely be said that they are not reached by any direct refusal to acknowledge the plain laws of right and wrong. Neither their own consciences nor those of their penitents would allow that to be done without instant protest. In fact, the

JESUIT EXPOSITION OF THE LAW. In theory is generally all that the most right moralist could ask for. What would be better, for example, than the following definition of a lie in Gary: "A lie is a word or sign contrary to the thought with the intention of deceiving." And even in their practical decision of any particular case they generally start out by taking high moral ground—high enough to satisfy the most exacting conscience. But the Jesuit has a ready device which he applies regularly and systematically for the purpose of reducing the sin to the smallest possible dimensions or of making it disappear altogether—just as the criminal lawyer has certain well-understood methods of defence which he may employ according to the nature of each case for the purpose of securing the acquittal of his client.

(c). The first of these that may be men-

tioned is to make the most of all extenuating circumstances, such as the occasional nature of the sin, ignorance of the consequences, the provocation and suddenness of the temptation. Of course, it is perfectly fair that some account should be taken of these circumstances. Some of them would certainly mitigate the punishment inflicted by any civil judge. But the civil judge would rarely allow as much weight to them as is commonly done by these casuists. The conscience of the average individual left to itself would generally take higher ground. In illustration of this may be quoted the very first case given by Gary in his great work on "Cases on Confession." Arnulfe, an honest man, but of a

QUARRELLOUS DISPOSITION. meets his enemy. Harassed by him with insults and blows, he is inflamed with a desire to kill him and springs upon him with a drawn dagger. He, however, masters his passion and runs away. On cooling down he is troubled at the thought of having committed the deadly assault, at once throws himself at the feet of his confessor and avows his fault.

Again: Though he has made earnest efforts to check a bad habit of cursing and swearing, in a quarrel with an opponent he breaks out into blasphemy, and again betakes himself to the confessor to clear his conscience.

On another occasion, knowing that he is apt to be quarrelsome when intoxicated, he takes care to avoid drinking to excess. But being urged by his companions to drink more than usual, he becomes intoxicated before thinking of his danger, and in a rage quarrels with the others. On coming to himself he hurries to do penance and goes to his confessor.

2. Has Arnulfe sinned in these three instances?

A. He does not seem to have sinned in any of the three cases, at least seriously, because he had not a full and perfect knowledge of the evil, and there was no premeditation, as may be gathered from the circumstances of the cases.

2. A second method adopted is to give the penitent the benefit of every possible doubt that can be raised in his favor. This again is a recognized principle of jurisprudence to which some place may be given in morals if properly restricted. But instead of restricting it within the narrow limits the Jesuit extends it as far as he possibly can and no lawyer ever displayed greater ingenuity in raising doubts than the average Jesuit. He raises doubts as to matters of fact, and wherever there can be any uncertainty always presumes that state of the case which is most favorable to his penitent.

He raises doubts as to his responsibility for consequences, and if there is any way of accounting for these other than by the direct act of his penitent, whatever his intention may have been, it is used in his favor. He suggests doubt as to the amount of deliberation that preceded an act and if in any way it can be made out to be unintentional or the result of a sudden impulse.

ITS HEINOUSNESS DISAPPEARS, and it becomes a venial sin. He suggests doubt as to the obligation resting on his penitent to fulfil inconvenient promises that have been given, or inconvenient contracts that have been agreed on, doubts as to the obligation to tell the truth, even on oath, when there is any serious reason for concealing it and for misleading the interrogator, doubts as to the obligation to make reparation for wrongs done, doubts as to the obligation to do most of these cases a high sense of honor or a tender conscience would lead a man to decide these doubts against himself. The Jesuit always allows them in favor of the culprit. And with such an array of possibilities it would need to be a clear case indeed in which some loophole of escape cannot be found.

3. Closely allied to this is the free use of the doctrine known as "probabilism." On many points there is room for difference of opinion as to whether certain things are allowable or not, and the various writers differ in their conclusions, which are expressed, therefore, with more or less hesitation. They are given as probable, or more probable than the opposite view. Now of course any one who is really serious in desiring to keep a good conscience can always do so by avoiding whatever is of doubtful morality. But that would be too high ground for the Jesuit to insist upon, and the only question is as to how far one may go in doubtful cases. There has been some discussion among them as to whether it is lawful to do so, and the point, many of them have held that it is lawful, which has ever been declared probably lawful by any acknowledged authority, and for which any defence whatever could be set up, was allowable and could be followed without censure, however doubtful it might be, even though the confessor disapproved of it, and the man's conscience might condemn it. Such lax views, however, brought down the condemnation of Rome, and in words at least they now confine license within somewhat narrower limits. A course must ordinarily be declared probably lawful by some considerable number of authors before it can be taken without sin. Even yet, however, one may have the gravest doubts about the propriety of it, and the confessor may wholly disapprove of it, but he is bound, nevertheless, to give him absolution. One is not bound even to be consistent with himself, may act on one opinion to-day and on its opposite to-morrow as best suits his interest, and still claim the benefit of the doctrine. Of course many men have always acted on this principle, but it remained for the

JESUIT TO JUSTIFY IT. We can hardly conceive of anything more fitted to debauch conscience and destroy its sensitiveness.

4. A fourth method consists in the indiscriminate use of general principles which are true only within certain limits and can be safely followed only under certain conditions. Principles, for example, which hold good in ordinary jurisprudence are not necessarily true in ethics. But by the Jesuits they are freely allowed.

Thus for instance in law a man is not bound to criminate himself—an important principle which is intended to protect the individual against possible judicial tyranny, but wholly out of place in the court of conscience. The Jesuit uses it

to excuse silence even when this leads to the most serious consequences for innocent victims.

Again it is a general rule in law that a man is bound to make restitution only for damage actually caused. Father Gary uses it to excuse a man who has killed the head of a family from making any restitution to the family, because as he was wasteful and intemperate they are really better off without him.

Generally speaking, a man is held responsible only for what he intends to do. Gary uses this principle to acquit from responsibility for any unforeseen consequence of a man's crime. A burglar enters a store to steal and accidentally sets fire to the place. He is under no obligation to make restitution because he did not intend to burn it down. On the other hand he is not responsible for the goods he meant to steal, because he failed to get away with them. A murderer shoots at one man and kills another. He is under no obligation to his family as he did not intend to shoot him.

To this same class belongs the famous maxim about which there has been so much controversy, that the end justifies the means, in the sense that it is lawful to do evil that good may come. This is a principle which holds good within certain limits in time of war and perhaps within still narrower limits in the detection of criminals. The Jesuits have always

REPUDIATED THE CHARGE of using this principle in any improper sense. Their denial is both true and false. So far as my knowledge of their works goes they do not directly appeal to it, except as warranting a prisoner in using deception and violence in making his escape from prison. But many of their worst conclusions practically involve it, e.g., dissimulation and even falsehood are excused in the interests of the Church, clandestine baptism is permitted in order to make sure of a prominent convert, who would otherwise suffer great inconvenience; mental reservation and equivocation may be employed by almost anybody when there is any strong reason, legitimate or otherwise, for concealing the truth; secret compensation or stealing is permitted when a man cannot easily get what he considers his rights in any other way; forgery is excused if it be committed to replace a valid document lost or destroyed that is necessary to make good a claim. It is also clearly involved in the following passage from their Constitutions, which on the face of it purports to forbid it:

"Although the Society desires all its constitutions, declarations and order of life to be observed according to our institution, in no wise deviating in any matter, it is nevertheless fitting that all its members should be secured, or at least aided, against falling into the snare of any sin which may arise from the force of its constitutions or injunctions. It seems good to us, therefore, in the Lord, besides the express vow whereby the Society is bound to the Superior Pontiff for the time being, and the three other essential vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, that no constitutions, declarations or order of living can involve obligation to sin, mortal or venial; unless the superior command these in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ or in virtue of holy obedience, which may be done in those matters or persons wherein it shall be judged that it will conduce greatly to the private or public good."

In face of these facts denial is simply an equivocation. If they make so little open use of the maxim it is not because they do not believe in it, but simply because they have so many other methods of letting down the standard which do not at once reveal the conscience, that they have not much need for one which most assuredly would do so.

The paper was received with applause and the views expressed were generally upheld by the speakers who followed. The report of the Committee on Indecent Festivals, including the memorial to Council, was read and adopted.

FATHER JONES TO PROFESSOR SCRIMGER. To the Editor of the Montreal Star: Sir—I am sorry to see the Star condescending to become the echo of the Ministerial Association in its attacks on the code of Catholic morality; for the heading "Moral Teaching of the Jesuits" and for all its intentions and purposes might as well have been: "Moral de l'Eglise Catholique."

Liguori was not a Jesuit, but was the founder of the Order of the Holy Redeemer, worthily represented in this city by the Redeemtorial Fathers of St. Ann's parish. The teaching of St. Alphonsus Liguori has received at the hands of the Holy See the most solemn approval, when the saint himself was honored with the title of Doctor of the Church.

Gary was indeed a Jesuit, personally known to me as a venerable, God-fearing man. But the exponent of the Ministerial Association has no right to point out in what Gary, the Jesuit, differs from St. Liguori, or from other approved Catholic moralists. Until this be done every Catholic will look upon the attack as directed, not against the much-lamented order, but against his mother Church.

The columns of the daily press are not the place wherein to discuss intricate and delicate questions of ethics. Men, who very commendably and with righteous indignation, tear down the objectionable poster at the street corner with one hand, and distribute with the other F. Chini's "Confessional" or Paul Bert's "Moral des Jesuites," can scarcely be looked upon as seriously in earnest.

Furthermore, the general public, not having had any special training in the matter, are as liable to blunder in the interpretation of the language of the "Schools," as our well-meaning fellow citizen, Professor Scrimger. And where is the wonder, for other and abler men have done so before him.

I see that in a Christian spirit, as personally I deem him an amiable, kind-hearted and upright man, in no case more than in his, would one be more reluctant to judge intentions harshly, or more willing to condone shortcomings, with all that excessive leniency which he supposes Jesuit moralists are inclined to in the case of repentant sinners.

I instance the only point in the two columns of yesterday's Star which bears directly and exclusively on the Jesuit Order. Had our worthy professor been

more familiar with ecclesiastical Latin, or the technical expressions of canon law, he would not, I am persuaded, have grossly misinterpreted the meaning of one passage of the constitutions of the Society of Jesus. Let me recall the quotation as given in the Star:

"Although the Society desires all its constitutions, declarations and order of life to be observed according to our institution, in no wise deviating in any matter, it is nevertheless fitting that all its members should be secured, or at least aided, against falling into the snare of any sin which may arise from the force of its constitutions or injunctions. It seems good to us, therefore, in the Lord, besides the express vow whereby the Society is bound to the Superior Pontiff for the time being, and the three other essential vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, that no constitutions, declarations or order of living can involve obligation to sin, mortal or venial; unless the superior command these in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of holy obedience, which may be done in those matters or persons wherein it shall be judged that it will conduce greatly to the private or public good."

The foregoing purports to be a translation of the 5th chapter of the 6th part of the Institute. If we are to take it as meaning that the Superior may enjoin on his inferior a sinful action in virtue of his obedience, it is a monstrous perversion of the plain meaning of the text, which is taught else than that nothing in the Constitutions, rules, or order of living, can involve obligation to sin, mortal or venial, or mortal, in virtue of the rule itself. But that, in some special case, the Superior may command what falls within the scope of the Constitutions, in virtue of the vow of obedience made to him. The only exceptions to this are the essential vows of the religious state, poverty, chastity and obedience, and the vow made to the Superior Pontiff himself in the matter of missions; for any willful violation of these vows would be necessarily sinful.

One might have thought that the very heading of this chapter 5th would have been sufficient to clear up any doubt but that the Jesuits have been so careful to make their meaning clear by a long and tedious periphrasis. The Constitutions involve no obligation to sin. The preamble is still more explicit. "It is nevertheless fitting that all its members should be secured, or at least aided, against falling into the snare of any sin which may arise from the force of its constitutions or injunctions. It seems good to us, therefore, in the Lord, besides the express vow whereby the Society is bound to the Superior Pontiff for the time being, and the three other essential vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, that no constitutions, declarations or order of living can involve obligation to sin, mortal or venial; unless the superior command these in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ or in virtue of holy obedience, which may be done in those matters or persons wherein it shall be judged that it will conduce greatly to the private or public good."

Whatever may be said of "obligation to sin" as a classical phrase, it is certainly used in theological works fully three hundred years before the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus were written. St. Thomas Aquinas was born in 1226; the Society of Jesus was in its infancy in 1534. St. Thomas uses the identical phrase with identically the same meaning. The exponent of the Ministerial Association followed the course of Catholic Theology, no doubt he would have been aware of this fact, and not have ventured beyond his depth. Since he has gone to some pains to read up Gary, etc., let him, out of pure love of truth, consult the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas, Secunda Secundae, Quest. 186, art. 9: "Utrum Religiosus possit peccare mortaliter transgrediendo ea quae sunt in regula." i.e., Does a religious always sin mortally in transgressing what is prescribed by the rule? St. Thomas solves the question negatively, and, in answer to the objections he himself proposes, he says: "The religious state is more secure than the secular." Hence Gregory (in principle doctoral) compares secular life to a troubled sea, and religious life to a tranquil haven. Sed et quia transgressio eorum quae in regula continentur, religiosus obligatur ad peccatum mortale, but if every transgression of what is contained in the rule obliges the religious (ad peccatum mortale) under pain of mortal sin, the religious state would be most dangerous, on account of the multiplicity of observances, therefore not every transgression of what is contained in the rule is a mortal sin (est peccatum mortale).

In the solution of his second objection he proceeds to say: "Sicut ergo in lege civilis non facit semper dignum poenam expressa transgressio legis statuti: nec in lege Ecclesiae quae ordinatiora sunt publicis statuta obligant ad mortale: et similiter nec omnia statuta regum, etc." "As therefore by the civil law the physical transgression of a legal statute does not always render one worthy of the death penalty; so, by the law of the Church, not every ordinance or public statute obliges under pain of mortal sin (obligant ad peccatum mortale), and likewise not every prescription of the rule."

The conclusion of all this is obvious, namely, that by every canon of interpretation, the impugned passages from the Constitutions of the Jesuits should be rendered in English as follows:

"It seems fitting to us, therefore, in the Lord, besides the express vow whereby the Society is bound to the Superior Pontiff for the time being, and the three other essential vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, that no constitutions, declarations or order of living can oblige under pain of mortal sin (under pain of sin) mortal or venial; unless the superior command these in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ or in virtue of holy obedience, etc."

The zeal of the Ministerial Association may to themselves appear praiseworthy, and the efforts of their exponent sincere; but please let it be expended on some laudable object, reviving, for instance, their Confession of Faith. With this they should have their hands full for some time to come. But when they go beyond their

sphere, and attempt evilly to interpret religious Constitutions which the Catholic Church has sanctioned and declared holy, they make themselves unnecessarily offensive, or, much worse, they, the preachers of a gospel of peace, stir up religious strife. I dare not say that ignorance, like charity, covers a multitude of sins, but according to the "law" of the Jesuits it at least diminishes their guilt; and may this one day be their excuse before God; they know not what they did. When convicted, however, of such ignorance, as in the present instance, but one thing is left for an honest man to do, and that is to repair the injury done their neighbor by their slander. By not so doing, if they be in good faith, they openly expose the principles they condemn. If, on the other hand, they maliciously circulate evil reports, with a view of injuring a religious body, they father on themselves the maxim which they have never found in any Catholic theologian, that "the end justifies the means."

A. E. Jones, S. J., St. Mary's College, 25 February.

Rev. Mr. Scrimger to Father Jones.

To the Editor of the Montreal Star: Sir—I trust you will allow me space for a brief reply to the animadversions of Father Jones on my paper before the Ministerial Association concerning the moral teaching of the Jesuits.

It is hardly worth while to resent his reflections on the Association itself or the somewhat gratuitous advice he is pleased to tender it. I have no doubt it will continue as heretofore to use its influence in restraint of immorality and indecency, even though it should be necessary sometimes to expose it to the public eye. I am not aware that it is responsible for the distribution of either Cominy's "Confessional" or Paul Bert's "Moral des Jesuites." But I think I can safely promise that it will advocate the suppression of the latter when Jesuit authorities consent to suppress or discard all works like those of Gary, of which it is simply an exposure by giving a fair translation of fairly chosen selections. I made no personal charge against Father Gary and am glad to know that he was such an estimable man, but to me his writings are simply abominable—absolutely so, even for a casuist.

I appreciate Father Jones' kindly words about myself and hope I shall always continue to deserve them. But I cannot consent to let him under his charge of ignorance in his rendering of a Latin phrase such as that referred to in the constitutions of the Jesuit order, that those constitutions are not to "involve obligation ad peccatum mortale or venial, unless the Superior command these." All he has shown is that in view of the usage of St. Thomas Aquinas three hundred years before, the expression "obligatio ad peccatum" may mean an obligation under pain of sin, and that thus the passage would lose its sinister character as authorizing a superior to order that which is sinful. But I submit that it is not the natural meaning of the phrase. *Peccatum* means sin, not the penalty of sin, and "obligatio ad peccatum" means obligation to sin. In this very chapter it is used as the equivalent of *obligatio peccati*, which even Father Jones renders "obligation of sin." His explanation is not in harmony with the usage of Jesuit writers of the present day. I open Gary almost at random and I find "obligatio ad rem impossibilem," "obligatio ad rem illicitam," in the obvious sense of obliging to do something impossible, unlawful. Nor in the case of Father Jones does it seem to me that the context suggests his rendering. The heading of the chapter according to his own correct translation is: "The first part of the chapter is simply an expansion of this admirable limitation of obedience, and then an exception is added: 'Unless the Superior command these' (nisi Superior a juberit). I am prepared to admit, however, that Father Jones is in a better position than I am possibly to be to know what is the interpretation put upon this famous passage in the constitutions at the present time among the members of his Order, and am glad to learn that, whatever may have been its original intention, it is now understood in an unobjectionable sense."

But in that case I am somewhat puzzled at the following passage in Gary on the obedience due to superiors in religious orders, which looks to me marvellously like giving the superior the right to override the scruples of his subordinates. "Over a member of a religious order bound to obey when in doubt whether a thing is lawful or not? Yes, indeed, etc." (An Religious tenetur obedire in dubio, utrum res praecipiat sit licita, necne? Affirm, quia, etc.).

I agree, however, with Father Jones in thinking that the columns of the daily press are not the place wherein to discuss intricate and delicate questions of ethics and will not enlarge upon this point. Only I am the more surprised that holding this opinion he should have selected that point for discussion which the general public is perhaps least capable of comprehending, turning as it does upon the meaning of a Latin phrase which has not even the merit of being good Latin. It looks like an attempt to divert the attention of the public from the real issue in which alone it can have any permanent interest, viz., as to what is the prevailing tone and character of Jesuit teaching.

My description of that rests upon too many passages to be the result of any mis-translation of nice phrases and remains as yet untouched.

As to whether teaching is better or worse than that of the rest of the Roman Catholic Church, I care little. But were it with the plain, I think a considerable amount of difference might be made out. I am no admirer of Liguori, who I am well aware was not a Jesuit, but I am not prepared to accept the position that even he is virtually at one in his teaching with the bulk of Jesuit authors.

JOHN SCRIMGER, Montreal, February 26, 1890.

Father Jones to Rev. Mr. Scrimger. To the Editor of the Montreal Star:

Sir—It is somewhat reluctantly that I again bespeak a place in your columns for the present communication, for I am aware that I may be crowding out some interesting matter. I have all the more scruple in thus trespassing on your patience, as I am not particularly anxious

to have the last word when the object of my writing is sufficiently attained.

Let me first assure my amiable antagonist that I am not attempting to divert the attention of the public from the real issue, namely: What is the prevailing tone and character of Jesuit teaching? That prevailing tone and character is, in fact, the prevailing tone and character of the teaching of the Catholic Church. When a Jesuit, or any other Catholic moralist, goes astray, his teaching is denounced to the Holy See. Should he not humbly submit, he ceases to be both a Jesuit and a Catholic. Now, Gary is taught in most of the Catholic theological seminaries throughout the world, and during the last quarter of a century no author of moral theology has been more widely known to Catholic theological students. We have yet to hear of his having incurred any censure by his teaching.

I can but vaguely surmise what effect this argument may have on the Ministerial Association, but for a Catholic it is peremptory, that its first point remains unshaken, viz., that the attack on St. Liguori and on his humble follower, Gary, is but a blind, and the report of Professor Scrimger's paper should have been headed, not the "Moral des Jesuites," but the "Moral de l'Eglise Catholique." Professor Scrimger may care very little, as he assures us, whether Jesuit teaching be better or worse than the rest of the Catholic Church. I am not sorry to differ with him in this, but am quite satisfied to have it said that it is no better and no worse. The Professor, however, in this seeming indifference, is scarcely in touch with his fellow religious, else why all this outcry against Jesuit teaching in the secular Province?

The second point is sufficiently covered by the amendment in yesterday's letter: "All he (F. Jones) has shown is that, in view of the usage of St. Thomas, three hundred years before, the expression 'obligatio ad peccatum' may mean an obligation under pain of sin, etc." which is not at all a bird showing in the case.

A few minor difficulties, however, yet remain. To clear some of these away I must remark that because *peccatum* means sin it does not follow that "obligatio ad peccatum" means an obligation to commit sin. Why not gracefully admit that "ad," being used by both Liguori and Cleoro for "aque ad" in the sense of *into*, when used with that signification, is quite classical. To prove this I made a reference in my last to Leverett's dictionary, of which, I am sorry to say, no account has been taken since Professor Scrimger now insists that it has not even the merit of being good Latin. Theologians are generally not particular to a degree as to the elegance of their Latin, but it is quite discouraging when they are to be rated for following Tully.

What, however, is more grievous is that the marginal references have been set at naught. This I shall endeavor to remedy, though I already quoted one in my last. I do not impeach the professor's fairness, for very likely he has been quoting at second hand. It indeed he has a copy of the Institutes of things, that his eye should not have fallen on the 31st number of the summary of the constitutions where we are exhorted to conform our will and judgment, "wholly to the superior's will and judgment, in all things where there appears no sin."

Let us, in the second place, assure Professor Scrimger that the interpretation of the Society's constitutions were as much in keeping with sound morality in the past as they are to-day. He has been kind enough to take my word for the present, and it will not be difficult to satisfy the most fastidious as to ages gone by. Saint, one of the Society's greatest theologians, who was born in 1549, and died in 1617, wrote a large volume on the Society's constitutions, and he may be taken as a safe expounder of their meaning. The following citation is from Book IV. De Vita et, ch. XII, § 7: "Tertia pars (constitutionum), § 3, dicitur obedientiam esse superiorem, licet diffinita secundum sensum repugnantis jubet. Et infert dicitur: 'In omnibus exceptio decet, omnia actionem hominum sub materia hujus vel comprehendit; et ita ibi concludit, voluntatem superiorem pro regulae propter voluntatem habendam esse; ergo haec obedientia non limitatur per aliquam regulam scriptam, sed per regulam vivam, quae est voluntas superioris intra latitudinem materiae honestae. Idem sumitur ex sexta parte constitutionum, cap. I, § 1, ibi: Ita ut omnibus obedientia extenderet, id est, in quibus nullum ad manifestum peccatum (at ibi in declarationibus explicatur) ad ejus vocem. . . obedientiam praestantem, etc." which may be rendered thus:

"In part third, § 3 of the constitutions, it is declared that the superior is to be obeyed even though he command what is arduous and repugnant to sensuality. And further on: In all things wherein sin appears not. Which exception implies that every righteous action is comprised in the matter of this vow; so that the conclusion is there drawn, that the will of the superior is to be obeyed, the rule of our own will; hence this obedience is not limited by any written, but by a living rule, which is the superior's will within the scope of a worthy object. The same is drawn from the sixth part, chap. I, § 1, it is then stated: § 3 that in all things to which, in the spirit of charity, obedience may extend, that is, in which there is no manifest sin (as is there declared in explanation) we yield obedience to his (the superior's) voice."

Therefore, in the past the interpretation of the impugned passage was just as unobjectionable as it is at present.

And let the Professor have no qualms of conscience, since it is said "wherein there is no manifest sin" or because Gary decides, that when there is doubt, the superior is to be obeyed, for practically the inferior has every facility for clearing up such doubt. Supposing, however, a case where the doubt persists, which of the two does the Professor think would be in the right, the inferior or the superior? Let him look to his own household and see how he would brook any such hesitancy on the part of one of his sons.

But Gary says, in the place is found in random, "obligatio ad rem impossibilem, etc."? Certainly, nor did I ever content that "obligatio ad" was never used. "Ad," indeed, is used in more than one sense.

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