

It must be admitted, however, that European leaders — particularly the French — gave credence to the myth and serious doubts as to the origin of Canada's foreign policy. One of the deep-seated causes — never openly stated — of the crisis in relations between France and Canada from 1967 to 1969 undoubtedly lies in this assessment.

Position altered

Third Option policy has, without question, altered this position. The change did not come about immediately after it was officially announced in the fall of 1972. The now-famous article by Mitchell Barnett in a special issue of this magazine; as only after many long explanations by officials at different levels of government that the most reserved of European leaders understood the innovative character of this option. I personally recall being struck by the surprise manifested by staunch Gaullist members of French leadership circles when they were first made aware, in 1973, of the content of Third Option policy. The reaction

"Basically, what Canada wants is the same thing France wants — greater freedom of movement, but within the Atlantic alliance". The same persons admitted that it would be greatly to Canada's advantage to make this policy better known. Today, this has been achieved. The example of France is significant, in that country that the image of Canada unconditionally tied to the United States was most widespread. However, the views of Western European leaders should be considered systematically in which case different types of relations, at different levels, may be regarded in turn. Let us consider first the position of the leadership circles in the European Economic Community; then the position of the larger countries (all of which are members of the Community in any case); next the position of the smaller member countries of the Community; and, finally, the position of other non-European countries.

Canada signed an agreement this year with the Community — though not without some difficulty. It is well-known that since 1972, officials of the Community (the EC Commission, the Council of Ministers and senior government officials) had had reservations about ties of partnership with Canada. They wished particularly to avoid setting a precedent that would allow any other industrialized state to claim similar advantages. Clearly, it was not that Canada would be the Trojan

horse by means of which the United States would gain entry to the Community.

At the same time, the fact that Canada had, a short time previously, reviewed its defence policy and relegated its NATO participation to third place among its priorities (after the defence of its own territory and the defence of North America) left Europeans with the impression that Canada was losing interest in Europe and withdrawing into itself. In concrete terms, members of the Council of Ministers of the Community could observe the withdrawal of half the Canadian military forces stationed in Europe. However, the Prime Minister's trips to Brussels and the capitals of the other member countries cleared the way for an agreement. The groundwork for these visits was laid by the discreet but untiring efforts of the Mission of Canada to the European Communities and the contacts between senior officials of the Canadian Government and the European Economic Community. It was also stressed in Ottawa that Western European defence was of decisive importance for Canada, and the reinforcement of Canadian military "hardware" in Germany by German *Leopard* tanks was a concrete expression of this change in defence policy.

Resource attraction

Now that there exists an agreement between Canada and the European Economic Community, it might be asked what the leaders of the Community expect of Canada. Raw materials, which Europe lacks, are certainly what most interests the Europeans. The content of the agreement, however, is still quite vague. It is a framework within which all sorts of joint projects could be discussed and initiated. The widespread feeling among "Eurocrats" — the name coined to describe senior officials of the Common Market — is that Canada itself is not quite sure what it expects of the Community. The standard reply in Ottawa is that the Canadian

Ottawa stressed importance of defence of Europe

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