Section 6 of the bill deals with the offence of forgery. At the present time three sections in the Code, 468, 469 and 470, specify more than forty different types of forgery. The maximum punishment under section 468 is imprisonment for life; under section 469 it is imprisonment up to fourteen years; and under section 470, imprisonment up to seven years. Frankly, I find it impossible to relate the maximum sentences to the respective offences set out in these three sections. Now it is proposed to do a little streamlining by repealing these sections and substituting therefor one section providing a single maximum of 14 years imprisonment for anyone convicted of forgery, which offence is defined in the Code.

Section 8 of the bill adds a new subsection to section 641 of the Code. Under subsection 3 of that section, if the police have raided premises where gaming house operations were being carried on the magistrate may authorize the seizure and destruction of things found therein and apparently intended to be used for an illegal purpose. In one such instance the police found a teletype machine which was owned, not by the people operating the gaming house, but by a communications company. The magistrate ordered the destruction of that equipment, and his decision was upheld on appeal. The new subsection 4 makes it clear that, notwithstanding any other provisions in the Code, the court may not order the seizure or destruction of any telephone, telegraph or communication equipment found upon gaming premises and owned by a telephone or telegraph company or by any government telephone or telegraph system.

Section 9 of the bill provides an amendment whereby a magistrate may order that an accused person who is suspected of being mentally ill shall be remanded for observation. Under the present provision in the Code a magistrate conducting a preliminary inquiry has to follow a certain procedure before having authority to make such an order. In various provinces devious methods were followed to get the authority out of the hands of the federal government under the Criminal Code, and to put it under some provincial statute by which a magistrate could order an accused remanded for observation. Section 9 of the bill gives authority to the magistrate at the preliminary inquiry, if he has reason to believe that an accused is suffering from mental illness, to remand him for observation for a period not exceeding thirty days.

Section 10 of the bill seeks to correct a peculiar situation which was found to exist concerning the release of exhibits. In one criminal trial a revolver filed at the preliminary hearing was required for the purpose of making ballistic experiments; but there was no provision in the Code under which its release could be ordered. This section of the bill authorizes a superior court judge or a county court judge to release an exhibit, upon terms which will safeguard the exhibit and prevent its mutilation.

Section 11 of the bill, which is a bit involved, will be of interest to all, particularly to lawyers. For some offences an accused person upon conviction before a magistrate has the right to launch an appeal. Under an amendment to the Criminal Code which parliament passed a few years ago, notice of that appeal could be served at any time within thirty days of the conviction. But the amendment did not go far enough, in view of the fact that another subsection of the same section provided that if a person was convicted fourteen days or more before the beginning of the sittings of the court to which his appeal lay, he must launch his appeal to the sittings of that court. The result was that many accused persons did not get the benefit of the thirty-day period. If an accused was convicted on March 1, and the sittings to which he would appeal commenced on March 16, his thirty-day period would be reduced to fifteen days, notwithstanding the fact that the same section of the Code said that he should have thirty days in which to appeal. Section 11 of the bill is for the purpose of reconciling the two subsections and relating the thirty-day period, and the sittings of the court appealed to, to the service of the notice of appeal rather than to the date of the original conviction.

Hon. Mr. Leger: Is the term not shortened to ten days?

Hon. Mr. Hayden: Not necessarily so. The bill provides that if the service is made ten days or more before the sittings of the court, the appeal must be heard at that sitting. Time runs from the date of service. In other words, if I made my service on the thirtieth day within which I had the right to appeal, the ten-day provision would apply, and I would have to go before the court sitting commencing within ten days. Time does not run against me in relation to the sittings of the court to which I must appeal until I serve my notice.

Hon. Mr. Aseltine: That is on an appeal from a summary conviction?

Hon. Mr. Hayden: Yes; where there is a trial *de novo* before a county court judge.

The effect of section 12 of the bill will be to shorten new trials when an appeal from a summary conviction is taken before a county court judge. At present, on such an appeal all the witnesses are brought before the judge,