

Asked by the Subcommittee whether there were instances when Canada had been denied access to information, strategic or otherwise, Dr. Lindsey testified that:

"It is difficult to quote exact numbers. Not too long ago we did make a survey of the number of reports that have been coming in from some of our allied countries and it is much less than it used to be. Of course we do not know what reports have been written...but it seems surprising that they are getting fewer. I think we find ourselves invited to less exchanges of information and scientific and technical meetings than we were. So we have more a feeling than a proof. I do not know of any case where we knew that there was something and did not get it...It is a little more subtle, but I am afraid the cumulative effect of it is rather serious."

The Subcommittee concludes that the need to obtain technical and scientific information available from the United States and other NATO countries and relevant to Canadian defence and other needs is great. While this consideration appears relevant to all defence arrangements, the Subcommittee concludes it is particularly relevant with respect to maritime defence arrangements given the degree of sophistication (and expense) of scientific and technical data involved.

## 9. PRIORITIES AND CRITERIA IN ALLOCATION OF ROLES FOR CANADIAN MARITIME FORCES

### 9.1 Maintenance of Sovereignty and Enforcement of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

The Subcommittee considers that the first responsibility of Canadian maritime forces during the 1970s must be the maintenance of sovereignty and enforcement of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

As already noted (Section 5.1), Canadian maritime forces need an independent capability to carry out police functions—military and non-military—required to maintain sovereignty and enforce extraterritorial jurisdiction. This is a requirement which has recently taken on vastly increased importance as a result, on the one hand, of rapidly growing exploitation of the continental shelf as defined and permitted by the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, and on the other hand by the extension twice over the past six years of Canadian fishing zones and the recent extension of Canada's territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles. Moreover, the increased attention to the Arctic where Canada has longstanding claims to sovereignty over the waters between the islands (which have now been greatly strengthened by the extension of the territorial sea), as well as the establishment of an extensive pollution control zone, have created further requirements. However, because the Arctic waters are frozen or ice-covered most of the year, these latter requirements call for a special solution. (See Section 10.5).

The Subcommittee is of the opinion that effective maintenance of sovereignty requires a capability of extensive surface and subsurface surveillance and identification, as well as a limited capability to localize and track specific instances of exploitation or violation—whether these be of resource rights on the continental shelf, transport regulations, customs regulations or fisheries regulations to name obvious examples. There is a further requirement for some limited but effective capability to challenge any actual instance of illegal exploitation or other violation of Canadian laws.