

This is a form of pressure which, of course, we can only condemn, and care must be exercised to see that the precedents which are created in dealing with this change of government in China do not give rise to further and greater difficulties in the future when analogous problems may have to be faced elsewhere in the United Nations.

This whole question of recognition of the Peiping government is now before the government, which is giving it active consideration in the light, among other things, of the report that I have made to the government, on our recent discussions in the Far East. At the moment I can say no more than that on this question.

We also had a pretty thorough discussion of the question of a Japanese peace treaty. Hon. members will recall that during my review of external affairs on November 16 last I said that, in spite of the difficulties to be overcome in convening a Japanese peace conference, I thought there might be even greater dangers in its indefinite postponement, and I hoped that another effort might be made to push forward with that conference. Since that time I have had an opportunity to discuss this problem at the Colombo conference, and also during my short but very interesting visit to Japan, where I talked about it and many other subjects with that most distinguished American, General Douglas MacArthur. As a result of those talks I am now more impressed than ever with the need for seizing every opportunity that might lead to a satisfactory early settlement with Japan. The occupation of Japan has continued now for more than four years. During that period the physical demilitarization of Japan has been thoroughly accomplished. Indeed, the act of stripping away from Japan her overseas possessions was itself a drastic curbing of Japan's war-making capacity. The punitive and preventive side of the occupation has, I think, been virtually completed. The Japanese have made many changes in their domestic legislation, in compliance with allied directives of the eleven-power Far Eastern commission which meets in Washington. They have subscribed to all orders of the occupation regime, and have taken the steps which were demanded of them.

I do not mean to conclude from this that the Japanese by now, in the course of four years, have completely changed their habits of thought, their approach to politics, and their way of life, although there appear to be some in Tokyo who think this has happened. Whatever may be the truth about this, it is clear that the Japanese have fulfilled pretty well the requirements that have been imposed upon them by the occupation, and it seems to me that from here on we must give them some incentive to maintain and strengthen the democratic way of life, and to wish to maintain close and friendly relations with the western world. I suggest our security lies in this as much as in keeping them disarmed. This point of view was brought very forcefully to us by the Asian members of the Commonwealth in their observations on a peace settlement with Japan. The other point of view - or more accurately, if you like, the other emphasis of the same point of view - was given by the Australian and New Zealand representatives at Colombo, who were anxious, as indeed we all are, that Japan should not be restored to a point where she could again become an aggressive power, and that the peace treaty should include clauses designed to prevent this.

Perhaps this prolonged occupation period will have served a purpose in enabling us to acquire a better perspective on the type of peace treaty we should make with Japan, which will, we hope, be a lasting one; one that should be realistic but not one that would be bitterly opposed as unjust by the Japanese