

November and succeeding weeks, but said he had noticed an increasingly pro-Israel tone in your most recent interventions in UN. He had been deeply disturbed by remarks in the House by the PM on March 6 referring to the use of "force" in connection with [Suez] Canal clearance and the presence of UN in Gaza and Aqaba. Egypt, he said, had lived in an atmosphere of threats for the last few months and people here were becoming more and more sensitive to threats. They were still living under threats from England, France and Israel (whom he linked with these two powers); Australia had openly showed its hostile intentions, the USA was showing a cold attitude and its press was generally pro-Israel, and now Canada, he said, had appeared to join the chorus against Egypt. Naturally this would have repercussions in their view of the Canadian contingent in UNEF. Then working late at night in his office on the 10th he had heard that Canadian troops had fired on demonstrators in Gaza that afternoon. He asked for a thorough investigation from competent quarters, but he had no convincing account of events until Dr Ralph Bunche² informed him (March 12) that it was Danish troops who had been involved. All these events, however incorrect some of them might prove now, had contributed to his growing fear of Canadian intentions; that Canada in some vague and ill-defined but alarming fashion had now joined forces with those powers which were most hostile to Egypt.

3. Since I had gone over your intervention and four-point proposal in the UN in great detail with Aly Sabry³, I told the President that I did not wish to take up his time again on this subject unless he had specific points to raise. I summarized our position in trying to find a fair compromise between two embattled and embittered parties and, as is so often the role of the peacemaker, being criticized unfairly by both. I concentrated especially on his distorted interpretation of the PM's remarks of March 6. (We had sent copies to competent officers in the Foreign Ministry of the

2. *Le sous-secrétaire général des Nations Unies. / United Nations Under-secretary General.*

3. *Le chef de cabinet du président Nasser. / President Nasser's chief of staff.*