

weapons. After a strong start following the Gulf War, this grouping has not been very active of late. These states continue, however, to play significant roles in other regimes and forums.

**London Nuclear Suppliers Group/Zangger Committee.** These groups, organized originally mainly by Western countries but now including East European states, address exports of nuclear materials and technology. The Zangger Committee (the Non-Proliferation Treaty Export Group) was formed in 1970. It supplied the "trigger list" of sensitive items to the IAEA. Export of any item on that list would have triggered the imposition of safeguards on them. The "London Club" was formed in 1974 but had not met for 15 years until 1990. In 1992 it updated its control list and introduced new guidelines for dual-use items. IAEA safeguards are a condition of supply. Members would "consult" about sanctions in the event of a test by a non-nuclear weapon state.

**Australia Group.** This ad hoc entity, formed in 1985 and with some 26 member countries, takes a similar interest in chemicals which could be used for weapons to that described above for the nuclear field. Since 1992 it has also concerned itself with the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons. It normally meets twice a year. It is expected that the Group will continue its activity after the CWC (see above) comes into effect, not only because it has some additional controls on chemical weapons related equipment but because of its interest in the biological and toxic weapons area.

**Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).** This is a voluntary arrangement among countries sharing a common interest in the control of the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Initially it concerned only those missiles with a nuclear capability but now it includes those that might be capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads. The MTCR is not based on a treaty, and has no mechanism established for verification or enforcement. It divides its concerns

between complete missile systems and major subsystems on the one hand, and dual-use<sup>10</sup> technology and components on the other. It updated its guidelines in 1993.

### Summary

This review has demonstrated the number and scope of the various bodies, treaties, agreements and regimes contributing to international peace and security. The number of bodies seems to be increasing, as is co-operation among them. Interstate confidence is enhanced through increased transparency. Recognition of the value of exchanging techniques developed separately, for example those developed for arms control purposes with those developed for peace operations, is on the rise. Nevertheless, the numbers of organizations and techniques seem to call out for some form of harmonization and synergy. The review also points out the lack of verification mechanisms in many cases and, in particular, the lack of enforcement options.

Some type of enforcement of compliance has been envisioned from time to time in various arms control agreements, particularly the NPT, but this has rarely been defined in any detail. A specific aspect of peace enforcement that needs attention is the notion of enforcing arms control agreements per se using peace enforcement forces. This is probably only an option in a very specific set of circumstances. The world community is going to have to develop some norms in this area if the concept continues to be advanced.

The role of the Security Council has been mentioned from time to time in connection with the implementation of compliance, and this will continue to be the case in the future. Sanctions have been the main weapon to date but, as we have seen, use of force is not impossible where the political will exists. Sanctions of course are a two-edged sword, often harming the innocent more than the guilty. This would also often be the case for one of the other two "non-use of force" options under Chapter VII of the UN

<sup>10</sup> The other uses are for space launchings and scientific probes of the upper atmosphere.

