

When this has been done, we can then see where we are, in regard to the political aspects of the Korean and Far Eastern questions. The Chinese Communists have now made it abundantly clear that they regard United Nations action in Korea as something that menaces their interests so greatly that they are willing to risk a general war in challenging it. Therefore, as soon as circumstances make it possible, we must take up again the effort to reconcile on the one hand the determination of the United Nations to resist aggression, and on the other whatever legitimate interests the Chinese may have in the future of Korea and the adjacent area. I am not sure that we *can* reconcile these two—our interest in world peace with the purposes behind their intervention—but we must try; and we must try by some more practical and effective means than mere public statements of good intentions and pious hopes.

During this period, when the peace of the world will be in balance, and when we shall be walking on the edge of a volcano which is rumbling alarmingly, we must not look for easy and spectacular results. We must realize that the Chinese Communist leaders, schooled in the tactics of public abuse which have long been part of the Soviet method of diplomacy, many of them completely ignorant of the Western world, are not likely to give us visible or audible help—will, in fact, make our task harder by vilifying us with scorn and slander and misrepresentation. But we need not give way to despair or to a fatalistic acceptance of something that is regarded as inevitable, and about which, therefore, nothing can be done, except to arm.

There is no reason, on the side of the free democracies, why the efforts which are now being made through the United Nations to localize and then end the war in Korea, should not succeed. We must, therefore, make it crystal clear—by our words and, more important, by our policies—that if they do not succeed, the responsibility will lie where it belongs; in Peking and in Moscow.

If as we trust, these efforts *do* succeed, the immediate danger of a Third World War would, for the moment, be removed. That would not, however, mean that we could rule out of calculation the possibility of such a war breaking out later. The materials for a fire would still be there; and there would still be madmen about with matches . . .

. . . If, . . . the leaders of international communism have convinced themselves that war with the West must come at some time, they may consider that their best opportunity will be in the months ahead. Because of this—and because of recent events in North Korea—the danger of a major war in the immediate future has, I think, increased . . .

The question whether the risk of a major war will diminish after, say, the end of 1951, depends of course, in large part on whether the Western world has been able to increase its defences and ensure the necessary unity of action; whether we can strengthen—as we are trying to do—the United Nations as an agency for preserving peace, for settling disputes and in the last analysis for organizing collective force against an aggressor. The free democracies are now taking steps to these ends at Lake Success and within the North Atlantic Organization. The crisis of the last few weeks in Korea has shown, with even greater clarity than before, the necessity for doing this and for doing it quickly and effectively.