

ground for the belief in personal survival after death" (p. 153), "It is that the more deeply and intensely we live the moral life, the more fully persuaded we become that there is in us something which cannot perish" (p. 152). And he cannot but believe "that anyone who is satisfied to pass into oblivion at death has somehow missed the moral experience that compels the conviction of continuity for his spiritual selfhood," and "has never experienced deeper and intenser moral living from one year to the next" (p. 155). It might be reasonably disputed that Mr. Martin's statements are in accord with all the facts; and it might well be asked whether his argument does not represent a disguised form of *petitio*? Is there not also an ambiguity in the phrase "passing into oblivion at death"?

A man may believe that at death his individual psycho-physical self, and with it his personal identity, ceases, and yet hold, like Goethe, that his influence and the memory of his personality by others will persist indefinitely. Plato and Cæsar, Shakespeare and Michael Angelo have not passed into oblivion. We think that Mr. Martin has not sufficiently investigated the relation of a "conviction of the continuity of spiritual selfhood" to the basis of an ethical system. Socrates and Spinoza refused to accept immortality as an indispensable foundation or postulate of moral endeavour; and the general trend among thinkers at the present time and for some years past has been to regard the belief as devoid of significance for the moral life. Mr. Martin himself admits that the belief is on the wane among all those who honestly face the difficulties; a statement which receives recent support from Professor Leuba's *Studies in the Belief in God and Immortality*, 1916, a book containing fresh and interesting statistical material. The argument that without this belief the goal of our strivings and highest aspirations cannot be fully attained and the moral life completed, raises the question whether there is warrant in the discoverable characteristics of the Universe for supposing that it cannot be otherwise. Is the contemplated goal more than an ideal which man has fashioned for himself? Are the attributes of goodness and justice ascribable to reality, and the evolutionary process in any sense intelligible to human beings? This extremely difficult problem must be faced and answered before the value of the statement that "the best within us, our own true being, cannot perish," can be appraised; or even before it can be determined whether it has any meaning at all.

The fact that many who believe in immortality seem to be unworthy of it, that the demand for it in their case is a bit of moral effrontery, and that some who appear to better merit survival do not demand it, goes to deprive moral arguments of their force. An universal and indiscriminate immortality seems to be *repugnant on moral grounds*: on the same grounds a conditional immortality, provided that the above-mentioned question were satisfactorily solved, might be intelligible and acceptable. To argue